Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
Strongly unforgeable signature schemes provide a more stringent security guarantee than the standard existential unforgeability. It requires that not only forging a signature on a new message is hard, it is infeasible as well to produce a new signature on a message for which the adversary has seen valid signatures before. Strongly unforgeable signatures are useful both in practice and as a building block in many cryptographic constructions. This work investigates a generic transformation that compiles any existential-unforgeable scheme into a strongly unforgeable one, which was proposed by Teranishi et al. [Teranishi/Oyama/Ogata, Cryptology-Indocrypt 2006] and was proven in the classical random-oracle model. Our main contribution is showing that the transformation also works against quantum adversaries in the quantum random-oracle model. We develop proof techniques such as adaptively programming a quantum random-oracle in a new setting, which could be of independent interest. Applying the transformation to an existential-unforgeable signature scheme due to Cash et al. [Cash/Hofheinz/Kiltz/Peikert, J. of Cryptology 2012], which can be shown to be quantum-secure assuming certain lattice problems are hard for quantum computers, we get an efficient quantum-secure strongly unforgeable signature scheme in the quantum random-oracle model.
@InProceedings{eaton_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2015.147,
author = {Eaton, Edward and Song, Fang},
title = {{Making Existential-unforgeable Signatures Strongly Unforgeable in the Quantum Random-oracle Model}},
booktitle = {10th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2015)},
pages = {147--162},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-939897-96-5},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2015},
volume = {44},
editor = {Beigi, Salman and K\"{o}nig, Robert},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2015.147},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-55540},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2015.147},
annote = {Keywords: digital signatures, strongly unforgeable, quantum random-oracle, lattices}
}
Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing