3 Search Results for "Lee, Seunghoon"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2022.14
On Explicit Constructions of Extremely Depth Robust Graphs

Authors: Jeremiah Blocki, Mike Cinkoske, Seunghoon Lee, and Jin Young Son

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 219, 39th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2022)

Abstract
A directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) is said to be (e,d)-depth robust if for every subset S ⊆ V of |S| ≤ e nodes the graph G-S still contains a directed path of length d. If the graph is (e,d)-depth-robust for any e,d such that e+d ≤ (1-ε)|V| then the graph is said to be ε-extreme depth-robust. In the field of cryptography, (extremely) depth-robust graphs with low indegree have found numerous applications including the design of side-channel resistant Memory-Hard Functions, Proofs of Space and Replication and in the design of Computationally Relaxed Locally Correctable Codes. In these applications, it is desirable to ensure the graphs are locally navigable, i.e., there is an efficient algorithm GetParents running in time polylog|V| which takes as input a node v ∈ V and returns the set of v’s parents. We give the first explicit construction of locally navigable ε-extreme depth-robust graphs with indegree O(log |V|). Previous constructions of ε-extreme depth-robust graphs either had indegree ω̃(log² |V|) or were not explicit.
Cite as

Jeremiah Blocki, Mike Cinkoske, Seunghoon Lee, and Jin Young Son. On Explicit Constructions of Extremely Depth Robust Graphs. In 39th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 219, pp. 14:1-14:11, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{blocki_et_al:LIPIcs.STACS.2022.14,
  author =	{Blocki, Jeremiah and Cinkoske, Mike and Lee, Seunghoon and Son, Jin Young},
  title =	{{On Explicit Constructions of Extremely Depth Robust Graphs}},
  booktitle =	{39th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2022)},
  pages =	{14:1--14:11},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-222-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{219},
  editor =	{Berenbrink, Petra and Monmege, Benjamin},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2022.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-158241},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2022.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Depth-Robust Graphs, Explicit Constructions, Data-Independent Memory Hard Functions, Proofs of Space and Replication}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.22
On the Security of Proofs of Sequential Work in a Post-Quantum World

Authors: Jeremiah Blocki, Seunghoon Lee, and Samson Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 199, 2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021)

Abstract
A Proof of Sequential Work (PoSW) allows a prover to convince a resource-bounded verifier that the prover invested a substantial amount of sequential time to perform some underlying computation. PoSWs have many applications including time-stamping, blockchain design, and universally verifiable CPU benchmarks. Mahmoody, Moran, and Vadhan (ITCS 2013) gave the first construction of a PoSW in the random oracle model though the construction relied on expensive depth-robust graphs. In a recent breakthrough, Cohen and Pietrzak (EUROCRYPT 2018) gave an efficient PoSW construction that does not require expensive depth-robust graphs. In the classical parallel random oracle model, it is straightforward to argue that any successful PoSW attacker must produce a long ℋ-sequence and that any malicious party running in sequential time T-1 will fail to produce an ℋ-sequence of length T except with negligible probability. In this paper, we prove that any quantum attacker running in sequential time T-1 will fail to produce an ℋ-sequence except with negligible probability - even if the attacker submits a large batch of quantum queries in each round. The proof is substantially more challenging and highlights the power of Zhandry’s recent compressed oracle technique (CRYPTO 2019). We further extend this result to establish post-quantum security of a non-interactive PoSW obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to Cohen and Pietrzak’s efficient construction (EUROCRYPT 2018).
Cite as

Jeremiah Blocki, Seunghoon Lee, and Samson Zhou. On the Security of Proofs of Sequential Work in a Post-Quantum World. In 2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 199, pp. 22:1-22:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{blocki_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2021.22,
  author =	{Blocki, Jeremiah and Lee, Seunghoon and Zhou, Samson},
  title =	{{On the Security of Proofs of Sequential Work in a Post-Quantum World}},
  booktitle =	{2nd Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2021)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-197-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{199},
  editor =	{Tessaro, Stefano},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143415},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Proof of Sequential Work, Parallel Quantum Random Oracle Model, Lower Bounds}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.13
Approximating Cumulative Pebbling Cost Is Unique Games Hard

Authors: Jeremiah Blocki, Seunghoon Lee, and Samson Zhou

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 151, 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)

Abstract
The cumulative pebbling complexity of a directed acyclic graph G is defined as cc(G) = min_P ∑_i |P_i|, where the minimum is taken over all legal (parallel) black pebblings of G and |P_i| denotes the number of pebbles on the graph during round i. Intuitively, cc(G) captures the amortized Space-Time complexity of pebbling m copies of G in parallel. The cumulative pebbling complexity of a graph G is of particular interest in the field of cryptography as cc(G) is tightly related to the amortized Area-Time complexity of the Data-Independent Memory-Hard Function (iMHF) f_{G,H} [Joël Alwen and Vladimir Serbinenko, 2015] defined using a constant indegree directed acyclic graph (DAG) G and a random oracle H(⋅). A secure iMHF should have amortized Space-Time complexity as high as possible, e.g., to deter brute-force password attacker who wants to find x such that f_{G,H}(x) = h. Thus, to analyze the (in)security of a candidate iMHF f_{G,H}, it is crucial to estimate the value cc(G) but currently, upper and lower bounds for leading iMHF candidates differ by several orders of magnitude. Blocki and Zhou recently showed that it is NP-Hard to compute cc(G), but their techniques do not even rule out an efficient (1+ε)-approximation algorithm for any constant ε>0. We show that for any constant c > 0, it is Unique Games hard to approximate cc(G) to within a factor of c. Along the way, we show the hardness of approximation of the DAG Vertex Deletion problem on DAGs of constant indegree. Namely, we show that for any k,ε >0 and given a DAG G with N nodes and constant indegree, it is Unique Games hard to distinguish between the case that G is (e_1, d_1)-reducible with e_1=N^{1/(1+2 ε)}/k and d_1=k N^{2 ε/(1+2 ε)}, and the case that G is (e_2, d_2)-depth-robust with e_2 = (1-ε)k e_1 and d_2= 0.9 N^{(1+ε)/(1+2 ε)}, which may be of independent interest. Our result generalizes a result of Svensson who proved an analogous result for DAGs with indegree ?(N).
Cite as

Jeremiah Blocki, Seunghoon Lee, and Samson Zhou. Approximating Cumulative Pebbling Cost Is Unique Games Hard. In 11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 151, pp. 13:1-13:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

Copy BibTex To Clipboard

@InProceedings{blocki_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.13,
  author =	{Blocki, Jeremiah and Lee, Seunghoon and Zhou, Samson},
  title =	{{Approximating Cumulative Pebbling Cost Is Unique Games Hard}},
  booktitle =	{11th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2020)},
  pages =	{13:1--13:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-134-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{151},
  editor =	{Vidick, Thomas},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-116983},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cumulative Pebbling Cost, Approximation Algorithm, Unique Games Conjecture, \gamma-Extreme Depth Robust Graph, Superconcentrator, Memory-Hard Function}
}
  • Refine by Author
  • 3 Blocki, Jeremiah
  • 3 Lee, Seunghoon
  • 2 Zhou, Samson
  • 1 Cinkoske, Mike
  • 1 Son, Jin Young

  • Refine by Classification
  • 2 Security and privacy → Hash functions and message authentication codes
  • 1 Mathematics of computing → Combinatorics
  • 1 Mathematics of computing → Graph theory
  • 1 Mathematics of computing → Paths and connectivity problems
  • 1 Security and privacy → Information-theoretic techniques
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Keyword
  • 1 Approximation Algorithm
  • 1 Cumulative Pebbling Cost
  • 1 Data-Independent Memory Hard Functions
  • 1 Depth-Robust Graphs
  • 1 Explicit Constructions
  • Show More...

  • Refine by Type
  • 3 document

  • Refine by Publication Year
  • 1 2020
  • 1 2021
  • 1 2022

Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail
© 2023-2024 Schloss Dagstuhl – LZI GmbH Imprint Privacy Contact