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DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2017.13
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-70200
URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/7020/
Bilò, Vittorio ; Mavronicolas, Marios
Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games
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Abstract
We study the complexity of decision problems about symmetric Nash equilibria for symmetric multi-player games. These decision problems concern the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium with certain natural properties. We show that a handful of such decision problems are Existential-R-complete; that is, they are exactly as hard as deciding the Existential Theory of the Reals.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{bil_et_al:LIPIcs:2017:7020,
author = {Vittorio Bil{\`o} and Marios Mavronicolas},
title = {{Existential-R-Complete Decision Problems about Symmetric Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Multi-Player Games}},
booktitle = {34th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2017)},
pages = {13:1--13:14},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-028-6},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2017},
volume = {66},
editor = {Heribert Vollmer and Brigitte Vallée},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/7020},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-70200},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2017.13},
annote = {Keywords: Nash equilibrium, complexity of equilibria, ExistentialR-completeness}
}
| Keywords: | Nash equilibrium, complexity of equilibria, ExistentialR-completeness | |
| Seminar: | 34th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2017) | |
| Issue date: | 2017 | |
| Date of publication: | 06.03.2017 |
