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Documents authored by Bartoletti, Massimo

Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2025.3
Formal Verification in Solidity and Move: Insights from a Comparative Analysis

Authors: Massimo Bartoletti, Silvia Crafa, and Enrico Lipparini

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 129, 6th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2025)

Abstract
Formal verification plays a crucial role in making smart contracts safer, being able to find bugs or to guarantee their absence, as well as checking whether the business logic is correctly implemented. For Solidity, even though there already exist several mature verification tools, the semantical quirks of the language can make verification quite hard in practice. Move, on the other hand, has been designed with security and verification in mind, and it has been accompanied since its early stages by a formal verification tool, the Move Prover. In this paper, we investigate through a comparative analysis: 1) how the different designs of the two contract languages impact verification, and 2) what is the state-of-the-art of verification tools for the two languages, and how do they compare on three paradigmatic use cases. Our investigation is supported by an open dataset of verification tasks performed in Certora and in the Aptos Move Prover.
Cite as

Massimo Bartoletti, Silvia Crafa, and Enrico Lipparini. Formal Verification in Solidity and Move: Insights from a Comparative Analysis. In 6th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2025). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 129, pp. 3:1-3:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2025)

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@InProceedings{bartoletti_et_al:OASIcs.FMBC.2025.3,
  author =	{Bartoletti, Massimo and Crafa, Silvia and Lipparini, Enrico},
  title =	{{Formal Verification in Solidity and Move: Insights from a Comparative Analysis}},
  booktitle =	{6th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2025)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:18},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-371-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2025},
  volume =	{129},
  editor =	{Marmsoler, Diego and Xu, Meng},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2025.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-230302},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2025.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Smart contracts, Solidity, Move, Verification, Blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.5
Formalizing Automated Market Makers in the Lean 4 Theorem Prover

Authors: Daniele Pusceddu and Massimo Bartoletti

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 118, 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)

Abstract
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are an integral component of the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, as they allow users to exchange crypto-assets without the need for trusted authorities or external price oracles. Although these protocols are based on relatively simple mechanisms, e.g. to algorithmically determine the exchange rate between crypto-assets, they give rise to complex economic behaviours. This complexity is witnessed by the proliferation of models that study their structural and economic properties. Currently, most of theoretical results obtained on these models are supported by pen-and-paper proofs. This work proposes a formalization of constant-product AMMs in the Lean 4 Theorem Prover. To demonstrate the utility of our model, we provide mechanized proofs of key economic properties like arbitrage, that at the best of our knowledge have only been proved by pen-and-paper before.
Cite as

Daniele Pusceddu and Massimo Bartoletti. Formalizing Automated Market Makers in the Lean 4 Theorem Prover. In 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 118, pp. 5:1-5:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{pusceddu_et_al:OASIcs.FMBC.2024.5,
  author =	{Pusceddu, Daniele and Bartoletti, Massimo},
  title =	{{Formalizing Automated Market Makers in the Lean 4 Theorem Prover}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)},
  pages =	{5:1--5:13},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-317-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{118},
  editor =	{Bernardo, Bruno and Marmsoler, Diego},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-198702},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Smart contracts, Ethereum, Verification, Blockchain}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.6
Towards Benchmarking of Solidity Verification Tools

Authors: Massimo Bartoletti, Fabio Fioravanti, Giulia Matricardi, Roberto Pettinau, and Franco Sainas

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 118, 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)

Abstract
Formal verification of smart contracts has become a hot topic in academic and industrial research, given the growing value of assets managed by decentralized applications and the consequent incentive for adversaries to tamper with them. Most of the current research on the verification of contracts revolves around Solidity, the main high-level language supported by Ethereum and other leading blockchains. Although bug detection tools for Solidity have been proliferating almost since the inception of Ethereum, only in the last few years we have seen verification tools capable of proving that a contract respects some desirable properties. An open issue is how to evaluate and compare the effectiveness of these tools: indeed, the existing benchmarks for general-purpose programming languages cannot be adapted to Solidity, given substantial differences in the programming model and in the desirable properties. We address this problem by proposing an open benchmark for Solidity verification tools. By exploiting our benchmark, we compare two leading tools, SolCMC and Certora, discussing their completeness, soundness and expressiveness limitations.
Cite as

Massimo Bartoletti, Fabio Fioravanti, Giulia Matricardi, Roberto Pettinau, and Franco Sainas. Towards Benchmarking of Solidity Verification Tools. In 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 118, pp. 6:1-6:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{bartoletti_et_al:OASIcs.FMBC.2024.6,
  author =	{Bartoletti, Massimo and Fioravanti, Fabio and Matricardi, Giulia and Pettinau, Roberto and Sainas, Franco},
  title =	{{Towards Benchmarking of Solidity Verification Tools}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)},
  pages =	{6:1--6:15},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-317-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{118},
  editor =	{Bernardo, Bruno and Marmsoler, Diego},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-198719},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Smart contracts, Ethereum, Verification, Blockchain}
}
Document
Invited Talk
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.1
MEV-Freedom, in DeFi and Beyond (Invited Talk)

Authors: Massimo Bartoletti

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 105, 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022)

Abstract
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to a class of recent attacks on public blockchains, where adversaries with the power to reorder, drop or insert transactions in a block can "extract" value from user transactions in the mempool. Empirical research has shown that mainstream DeFi protocols, like e.g. Automated Market Makers and Lending Pools, are massively targeted by MEV attacks. This has detrimental effects on their users, on transaction fees, and on the congestion of blockchain networks. Despite the growing knowledge on MEV attacks on blockchain protocols, an exact definition is still missing. Indeed, formally defining these attacks is an essential prerequisite to the design of provably secure, MEV-free blockchain protocols. In this talk, we propose a formal definition of MEV, based on a general, abstract model of blockchains and smart contracts. We then introduce MEV-freedom, a property enjoyed by contracts resistant to MEV attacks. We validate this notion by rigorously proving that Automated Market Makers and Lending Pools are not MEV-free. We finally discuss how to design MEV-free contracts.
Cite as

Massimo Bartoletti. MEV-Freedom, in DeFi and Beyond (Invited Talk). In 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 105, p. 1:1, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{bartoletti:OASIcs.FMBC.2022.1,
  author =	{Bartoletti, Massimo},
  title =	{{MEV-Freedom, in DeFi and Beyond}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:1},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-250-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{105},
  editor =	{Dargaye, Zaynah and Schneidewind, Clara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-171827},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, Formal Security Notion}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.40
Progress-Preserving Refinements of CTA

Authors: Massimo Bartoletti, Laura Bocchi, and Maurizio Murgia

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 118, 29th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2018)

Abstract
We develop a theory of refinement for timed asynchronous systems, in the setting of Communicating Timed Automata (CTA). Our refinement applies point-wise to the components of a system of CTA, and only affecting their time constraints - in this way, we achieve compositionality and decidability. We then establish a decidable condition under which our refinement preserves behavioural properties of systems, such as their global and local progress. Our theory provides guidelines on how to implement timed protocols using the real-time primitives of programming languages. We validate our theory through a series of experiments, supported by an open-source tool which implements our verification techniques.
Cite as

Massimo Bartoletti, Laura Bocchi, and Maurizio Murgia. Progress-Preserving Refinements of CTA. In 29th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 118, pp. 40:1-40:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{bartoletti_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.40,
  author =	{Bartoletti, Massimo and Bocchi, Laura and Murgia, Maurizio},
  title =	{{Progress-Preserving Refinements of CTA}},
  booktitle =	{29th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2018)},
  pages =	{40:1--40:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-087-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{118},
  editor =	{Schewe, Sven and Zhang, Lijun},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.40},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-95786},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.40},
  annote =	{Keywords: protocol implementation, communicating timed automata, message passing}
}
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