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Documents authored by Sadhukhan, Suman


Document
Computing Threshold Budgets in Discrete-Bidding Games

Authors: Guy Avni and Suman Sadhukhan

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 250, 42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022)


Abstract
In a two-player zero-sum graph game, the players move a token throughout the graph to produce an infinite play, which determines the winner of the game. Bidding games are graph games in which in each turn, an auction (bidding) determines which player moves the token: the players have budgets, and in each turn, both players simultaneously submit bids that do not exceed their available budgets, the higher bidder moves the token, and pays the bid to the lower bidder. We distinguish between continuous- and discrete-bidding games. In the latter, the granularity of the players' bids is restricted, e.g., bids must be given in cents. Continuous-bidding games are well understood, however, from a practical standpoint, discrete-bidding games are more appealing. In this paper we focus on discrete-bidding games. We study the problem of finding threshold budgets; namely, a necessary and sufficient initial budget for winning the game. Previously, the properties of threshold budgets were only studied for reachability games. For parity discrete-bidding games, thresholds were known to exist, but their structure was not understood. We describe two algorithms for finding threshold budgets in parity discrete-bidding games. The first algorithm is a fixed-point algorithm, and it reveals the structure of the threshold budgets in these games. Second, we show that the problem of finding threshold budgets is in NP and coNP for parity discrete-bidding games. Previously, only exponential-time algorithms where known for reachability and parity objectives. A corollary of this proof is a construction of strategies that use polynomial-size memory.

Cite as

Guy Avni and Suman Sadhukhan. Computing Threshold Budgets in Discrete-Bidding Games. In 42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 250, pp. 30:1-30:18, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


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@InProceedings{avni_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.30,
  author =	{Avni, Guy and Sadhukhan, Suman},
  title =	{{Computing Threshold Budgets in Discrete-Bidding Games}},
  booktitle =	{42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022)},
  pages =	{30:1--30:18},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-261-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{250},
  editor =	{Dawar, Anuj and Guruswami, Venkatesan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.30},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-174222},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.30},
  annote =	{Keywords: Discrete bidding games, Richman games, parity games, reachability games}
}
Document
Semilinear Representations for Series-Parallel Atomic Congestion Games

Authors: Nathalie Bertrand, Nicolas Markey, Suman Sadhukhan, and Ocan Sankur

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 250, 42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022)


Abstract
We consider atomic congestion games on series-parallel networks, and study the structure of the sets of Nash equilibria and social local optima on a given network when the number of players varies. We establish that these sets are definable in Presburger arithmetic and that they admit semilinear representations whose all period vectors have a common direction. As an application, we prove that the prices of anarchy and stability converge to 1 as the number of players goes to infinity, and show how to exploit these semilinear representations to compute these ratios precisely for a given network and number of players.

Cite as

Nathalie Bertrand, Nicolas Markey, Suman Sadhukhan, and Ocan Sankur. Semilinear Representations for Series-Parallel Atomic Congestion Games. In 42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 250, pp. 32:1-32:20, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


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@InProceedings{bertrand_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.32,
  author =	{Bertrand, Nathalie and Markey, Nicolas and Sadhukhan, Suman and Sankur, Ocan},
  title =	{{Semilinear Representations for Series-Parallel Atomic Congestion Games}},
  booktitle =	{42nd IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2022)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-261-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{250},
  editor =	{Dawar, Anuj and Guruswami, Venkatesan},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-174243},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2022.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: congestion games, Nash equilibria, Presburger arithmetic, semilinear sets, price of anarchy}
}
Document
Dynamic Network Congestion Games

Authors: Nathalie Bertrand, Nicolas Markey, Suman Sadhukhan, and Ocan Sankur

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 182, 40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020)


Abstract
Congestion games are a classical type of games studied in game theory, in which n players choose a resource, and their individual cost increases with the number of other players choosing the same resource. In network congestion games (NCGs), the resources correspond to simple paths in a graph, e.g. representing routing options from a source to a target. In this paper, we introduce a variant of NCGs, referred to as dynamic NCGs: in this setting, players take transitions synchronously, they select their next transitions dynamically, and they are charged a cost that depends on the number of players simultaneously using the same transition. We study, from a complexity perspective, standard concepts of game theory in dynamic NCGs: social optima, Nash equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibria. Our contributions are the following: the existence of a strategy profile with social cost bounded by a constant is in PSPACE and NP-hard. (Pure) Nash equilibria always exist in dynamic NCGs; the existence of a Nash equilibrium with bounded cost can be decided in EXPSPACE, and computing a witnessing strategy profile can be done in doubly-exponential time. The existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium with bounded cost can be decided in 2EXPSPACE, and a witnessing strategy profile can be computed in triply-exponential time.

Cite as

Nathalie Bertrand, Nicolas Markey, Suman Sadhukhan, and Ocan Sankur. Dynamic Network Congestion Games. In 40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 182, pp. 40:1-40:16, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)


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@InProceedings{bertrand_et_al:LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.40,
  author =	{Bertrand, Nathalie and Markey, Nicolas and Sadhukhan, Suman and Sankur, Ocan},
  title =	{{Dynamic Network Congestion Games}},
  booktitle =	{40th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2020)},
  pages =	{40:1--40:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-174-0},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{182},
  editor =	{Saxena, Nitin and Simon, Sunil},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.40},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-132811},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2020.40},
  annote =	{Keywords: Congestion games, Nash equilibria, Subgame perfect equilibria, Complexity}
}
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