3 Search Results for "Correia, Miguel"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.LDK.2021.25
Inconsistency Detection in Job Postings

Authors: Joana Urbano, Miguel Couto, Gil Rocha, and Henrique Lopes Cardoso

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 93, 3rd Conference on Language, Data and Knowledge (LDK 2021)

Abstract
The use of AI in recruitment is growing and there is AI software that reads jobs' descriptions in order to select the best candidates for these jobs. However, it is not uncommon for these descriptions to contain inconsistencies such as contradictions and ambiguities, which confuses job candidates and fools the AI algorithm. In this paper, we present a model based on natural language processing (NLP), machine learning (ML), and rules to detect these inconsistencies in the description of language requirements and to alert the recruiter to them, before the job posting is published. We show that the use of an hybrid model based on ML techniques and a set of domain-specific rules to extract the language details from sentences achieves high performance in the detection of inconsistencies.
Cite as

Joana Urbano, Miguel Couto, Gil Rocha, and Henrique Lopes Cardoso. Inconsistency Detection in Job Postings. In 3rd Conference on Language, Data and Knowledge (LDK 2021). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 93, pp. 25:1-25:16, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{urbano_et_al:OASIcs.LDK.2021.25,
  author =	{Urbano, Joana and Couto, Miguel and Rocha, Gil and Lopes Cardoso, Henrique},
  title =	{{Inconsistency Detection in Job Postings}},
  booktitle =	{3rd Conference on Language, Data and Knowledge (LDK 2021)},
  pages =	{25:1--25:16},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-199-3},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{93},
  editor =	{Gromann, Dagmar and S\'{e}rasset, Gilles and Declerck, Thierry and McCrae, John P. and Gracia, Jorge and Bosque-Gil, Julia and Bobillo, Fernando and Heinisch, Barbara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.LDK.2021.25},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-145612},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.LDK.2021.25},
  annote =	{Keywords: NLP, Ambiguities, Contradictions, Recruitment software}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LITES.7.1.1
Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication

Authors: Kristin Krüger, Nils Vreman, Richard Pates, Martina Maggio, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler

Published in: LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 7, Issue 1

Abstract
Time-triggered real-time systems achieve deterministic behavior using schedules that are constructed offline, based on scheduling constraints. Their deterministic behavior makes time-triggered systems suitable for usage in safety-critical environments, like avionics. However, this determinism also allows attackers to fine-tune attacks that can be carried out after studying the behavior of the system through side channels, targeting safety-critical victim tasks. Replication -- i.e., the execution of task variants across different cores -- is inherently able to tolerate both accidental and malicious faults (i.e. attacks) as long as these faults are independent of one another. Yet, targeted attacks on the timing behavior of tasks which utilize information gained about the system behavior violate the fault independence assumption fault tolerance is based on. This violation may give attackers the opportunity to compromise all replicas simultaneously, in particular if they can mount the attack from already compromised components. In this paper, we analyze vulnerabilities of time-triggered systems, focusing on safety-certified multicore real-time systems. We introduce two runtime mitigation strategies to withstand directed timing inference based attacks: (i) schedule randomization at slot level, and (ii) randomization within a set of offline constructed schedules. We evaluate these mitigation strategies with synthetic experiments and a real case study to show their effectiveness and practicality.
Cite as

Kristin Krüger, Nils Vreman, Richard Pates, Martina Maggio, Marcus Völp, and Gerhard Fohler. Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication. In LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security. Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp. 01:1-01:29, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@Article{kruger_et_al:LITES.7.1.1,
  author =	{Kr\"{u}ger, Kristin and Vreman, Nils and Pates, Richard and Maggio, Martina and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Fohler, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Randomization as Mitigation of Directed Timing Inference Based Attacks on Time-Triggered Real-Time Systems with Task Replication}},
  booktitle =	{LITES, Volume 7, Issue 1 (2021): Special Issue on Embedded System Security},
  pages =	{01:1--01:29},
  journal =	{Leibniz Transactions on Embedded Systems},
  ISSN =	{2199-2002},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{7},
  number =	{1},
  editor =	{Kr\"{u}ger, Kristin and Vreman, Nils and Pates, Richard and Maggio, Martina and V\"{o}lp, Marcus and Fohler, Gerhard},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LITES.7.1.1},
  doi =		{10.4230/LITES.7.1.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: real-time systems, time-triggered systems, security}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2017.28
Vulnerability-Tolerant Transport Layer Security

Authors: André Joaquim, Miguel L. Pardal, and Miguel Correia

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 95, 21st International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2017)

Abstract
SSL/TLS communication channels play a very important role in Internet security, including cloud computing and server infrastructures. There are often concerns about the strength of the encryption mechanisms used in TLS channels. Vulnerabilities can lead to some of the cipher suites once thought to be secure to become insecure and no longer recommended for use or in urgent need of a software update. However, the deprecation/update process is very slow and weeks or months can go by before most web servers and clients are protected, and some servers and clients may never be updated. In the meantime, the communications are at risk of being intercepted and tampered by attackers. In this paper we propose an alternative to TLS to mitigate the problem of secure commu- nication channels being susceptible to attacks due to unexpected vulnerabilities in its mechan- isms. Our solution, called Vulnerability-Tolerant Transport Layer Security (vtTLS), is based on diversity and redundancy of cryptographic mechanisms and certificates to ensure a secure communication even when one or more mechanisms are vulnerable. Our solution relies on a combination of k cipher suites which ensure that even if k − 1 cipher suites are insecure or vul- nerable, the remaining cipher suite keeps the communication channel secure. The performance and cost of vtTLS were evaluated and compared with OpenSSL, one of the most widely used implementations of TLS.
Cite as

André Joaquim, Miguel L. Pardal, and Miguel Correia. Vulnerability-Tolerant Transport Layer Security. In 21st International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2017). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 95, pp. 28:1-28:16, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)

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@InProceedings{joaquim_et_al:LIPIcs.OPODIS.2017.28,
  author =	{Joaquim, Andr\'{e} and Pardal, Miguel L. and Correia, Miguel},
  title =	{{Vulnerability-Tolerant Transport Layer Security}},
  booktitle =	{21st International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2017)},
  pages =	{28:1--28:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-061-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2018},
  volume =	{95},
  editor =	{Aspnes, James and Bessani, Alysson and Felber, Pascal and Leit\~{a}o, Jo\~{a}o},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2017.28},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-86437},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.OPODIS.2017.28},
  annote =	{Keywords: Secure communication channels, Transport layer security, SSL/TLS, Diversity, Redundancy, Vulnerability tolerance}
}
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