11 Search Results for "Li, Liyi"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.7
DeFiAligner: Leveraging Symbolic Analysis and Large Language Models for Inconsistency Detection in Decentralized Finance

Authors: Rundong Gan, Liyi Zhou, Le Wang, Kaihua Qin, and Xiaodong Lin

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has witnessed a monumental surge, reaching 53.039 billion USD in total value locked. As this sector continues to expand, ensuring the reliability of DeFi smart contracts becomes increasingly crucial. While some users are adept at reading code or the compiled bytecode to understand smart contracts, many rely on documentation. Therefore, discrepancies between the documentation and the deployed code can pose significant risks, whether these discrepancies are due to errors or intentional fraud. To tackle these challenges, we developed DeFiAligner, an end-to-end system to identify inconsistencies between documentation and smart contracts. DeFiAligner incorporates a symbolic execution tool, SEVM, which explores execution paths of on-chain binary code, recording memory and stack states. It automatically generates symbolic expressions for token balance changes and branch conditions, which, along with related project documents, are processed by LLMs. Using structured prompts, the LLMs evaluate the alignment between the symbolic expressions and the documentation. Our tests across three distinct scenarios demonstrate DeFiAligner’s capability to automate inconsistency detection in DeFi, achieving recall rates of 92% and 90% on two public datasets respectively.
Cite as

Rundong Gan, Liyi Zhou, Le Wang, Kaihua Qin, and Xiaodong Lin. DeFiAligner: Leveraging Symbolic Analysis and Large Language Models for Inconsistency Detection in Decentralized Finance. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 7:1-7:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{gan_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.7,
  author =	{Gan, Rundong and Zhou, Liyi and Wang, Le and Qin, Kaihua and Lin, Xiaodong},
  title =	{{DeFiAligner: Leveraging Symbolic Analysis and Large Language Models for Inconsistency Detection in Decentralized Finance}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209431},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Decentralized Finance Security, Large Language Models, Project Review, Symbolic Analysis, Smart Contracts}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.12
Payment Censorship in the Lightning Network Despite Encrypted Communication

Authors: Charmaine Ndolo and Florian Tschorsch

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
The Lightning network (LN) offers a solution to Bitcoin’s scalability limitations by providing fast and private off-chain payments. In addition to the LN’s long known application-level centralisation, recent work has highlighted its centralisation at the network-level which makes it vulnerable to attacks on privacy by malicious actors. In this work, we explore the LN’s susceptibility to censorship by a network-level actor such as a malicious autonomous system. We show that a network-level actor can identify and censor all payments routed via their network by just examining the packet headers. Our results indicate that it is viable to accurately identify LN messages despite the fact that all inter-peer communication is end-to-end encrypted. Additionally, we describe how a network-level observer can determine a node’s role in a payment path based on timing, direction of flow and message type, and demonstrate the approach’s feasibility using experiments in a live instance of the network. Simulations of the attack on a snapshot of the Lightning mainnet suggest that the impact of the attack varies from mild to potentially dramatic depending on the adversary and type of payments that are censored. We analyse countermeasures the network can implement and come to the conclusion that an adequate solution comprises constant message sizes as well as dummy traffic.
Cite as

Charmaine Ndolo and Florian Tschorsch. Payment Censorship in the Lightning Network Despite Encrypted Communication. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 12:1-12:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{ndolo_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.12,
  author =	{Ndolo, Charmaine and Tschorsch, Florian},
  title =	{{Payment Censorship in the Lightning Network Despite Encrypted Communication}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{12:1--12:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209484},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Lightning network, payment channel networks, censorship resistance}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22
Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?

Authors: Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To foster competition and preserve Ethereum’s decentralized ethos and censorship resistance properties, understanding the dominant players' competitive edges is essential. In this paper, we identify features that play a significant role in builders' ability to win blocks and earn profits by conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis of MEV-Boost auctions over a six-month period. We reveal that block market share positively correlates with order flow diversity, while profitability correlates with access to order flow from Exclusive Providers, such as integrated searchers and external providers with exclusivity deals. Additionally, we show a positive correlation between market share and profit margin among the top ten builders, with features such as exclusive signal, non-atomic arbitrages, and Telegram bot flow strongly correlating with both metrics. This highlights a "chicken-and-egg" problem where builders need differentiated order flow to profit, but only receive such flow if they have a significant market share. Overall, this work provides an in-depth analysis of the key features driving the builder market towards centralization and offers valuable insights for designing further iterations of Ethereum block auctions, preserving Ethereum’s censorship resistance properties.
Cite as

Burak Öz, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, and Florian Matthes. Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 22:1-22:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{oz_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22,
  author =	{\"{O}z, Burak and Sui, Danning and Thiery, Thomas and Matthes, Florian},
  title =	{{Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why?}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{22:1--22:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209589},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Block Building Auction, Proposer-Builder Separation, Maximal Extractable Value}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.23
A Shortfall in Investor Expectations of Leveraged Tokens

Authors: Reza Rahimian and Jeremy Clark

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Leveraged tokens (LVTs) are emerging crypto-assets primarily issued by centralized exchanges. The concept is borrowed from leveraged ETFs (LETFs) in traditional financial markets, which offer higher gains (and higher losses) relative to price movements in the underlying asset. Leverage is commonly used by short-term traders to amplify returns from daily market shifts. However, LVTs have been implemented differently from LETFs by exchanges in the crypto market, with variations across platforms. We examine the mechanics and constituent components of LVTs, demonstrating that the lack of a standard has resulted in deficiencies and unexpected technical and economic outcomes. To identify existing problems, we analyze more than 1,600 leveraged tokens from 10 issuers. Our analysis reveals that 99.9% of LVTs are centralized, with 80% lacking blockchain interaction, leading to transparency issues. Total supply information is difficult to access for 53% of them, and 41% appear inadequately backed at launch. Additionally, 97% of LVTs are vulnerable to front-running during well-known events, and they deviate from their stated leverage ratios more than LETFs, partly due to inconsistent re-leveraging processes and higher management fees. This work provides a framework for crypto investors, blockchain developers, and data analysts to gain a deep understanding of leveraged tokens and their impact on market dynamics, liquidity, and price movements. It also offers insights for crypto exchanges and auditors into the internal functionalities and financial performance of LVTs under varying market conditions.
Cite as

Reza Rahimian and Jeremy Clark. A Shortfall in Investor Expectations of Leveraged Tokens. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 23:1-23:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{rahimian_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.23,
  author =	{Rahimian, Reza and Clark, Jeremy},
  title =	{{A Shortfall in Investor Expectations of Leveraged Tokens}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{23:1--23:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.23},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209599},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.23},
  annote =	{Keywords: crypto-assets, ethereum, leverage, derivatives}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.28
SoK: Attacks on DAOs

Authors: Rainer Feichtinger, Robin Fritsch, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are blockchain-based organizations that facilitate decentralized governance. Today, DAOs not only hold billions of dollars in their treasury but also govern many of the most popular Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols. This paper systematically analyses security threats to DAOs, focusing on the types of attacks they face. We study attacks on DAOs that took place in the past, attacks that have been theorized to be possible, and potential attacks that were uncovered and prevented in audits. For each of these (potential) attacks, we describe and categorize the attack vectors utilized into four categories. This reveals that while many attacks on DAOs take advantage of the less tangible and more complex human nature involved in governance, audits tend to focus on code and protocol vulnerabilities. Thus, additionally, the paper examines empirical data on DAO vulnerabilities, outlines risk factors contributing to these attacks, and suggests mitigation strategies to safeguard against such vulnerabilities.
Cite as

Rainer Feichtinger, Robin Fritsch, Lioba Heimbach, Yann Vonlanthen, and Roger Wattenhofer. SoK: Attacks on DAOs. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 28:1-28:27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{feichtinger_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.28,
  author =	{Feichtinger, Rainer and Fritsch, Robin and Heimbach, Lioba and Vonlanthen, Yann and Wattenhofer, Roger},
  title =	{{SoK: Attacks on DAOs}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{28:1--28:27},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.28},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209640},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.28},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, DAO, governance, security, measurements, voting systems}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World

Authors: Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, and Tim Roughgarden

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 316, 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

Abstract
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model of active block producers that have their own private valuations for blocks (representing, for example, additional value derived from the application layer). The block producer surplus in our model can be interpreted as one of the more common colloquial meanings of the phrase "maximal extractable value (MEV)." We first prove that transaction fee mechanism design is fundamentally more difficult with active block producers than with passive ones: With active block producers, no non-trivial or approximately welfare-maximizing transaction fee mechanism can be incentive-compatible for both users and block producers. These results can be interpreted as a mathematical justification for augmenting transaction fee mechanisms with additional components such as order flow auctions, block producer competition, trusted hardware, or cryptographic techniques. We then consider a more fine-grained model of block production that more accurately reflects current practice, in which we distinguish the roles of "searchers" (who actively identify opportunities for value extraction from the application layer and compete for the right to take advantage of them) and "proposers" (who participate directly in the blockchain protocol and make the final choice of the published block). Searchers can effectively act as an "MEV oracle" for a transaction fee mechanism, thereby enlarging the design space. Here, we first consider a TFM that is inspired by how searchers have traditionally been incorporated into the block production process, with each transaction effectively sold off to a searcher through a first-price auction. We then explore the TFM design space with searchers more generally, and design a mechanism that circumvents our impossibility results for TFMs without searchers. Our mechanism (the "SAKA" mechanism) is incentive-compatible (for users, searchers, and the block producer), sybil-proof, and guarantees roughly 50% of the maximum-possible welfare when transaction sizes are small relative to block sizes. We conclude with a matching negative result: even when transaction sizes are small, no DSIC and sybil-proof deterministic TFM can guarantee more than 50% of the maximum-possible welfare.
Cite as

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, and Tim Roughgarden. Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World. In 6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 316, pp. 29:1-29:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{bahrani_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29,
  author =	{Bahrani, Maryam and Garimidi, Pranav and Roughgarden, Tim},
  title =	{{Transaction Fee Mechanism Design in a Post-MEV World}},
  booktitle =	{6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)},
  pages =	{29:1--29:24},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-345-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{316},
  editor =	{B\"{o}hme, Rainer and Kiffer, Lucianna},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209658},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.29},
  annote =	{Keywords: MEV, Transaction Fee Mechanisms, Auctions}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.24
Qafny: A Quantum-Program Verifier

Authors: Liyi Li, Mingwei Zhu, Rance Cleaveland, Alexander Nicolellis, Yi Lee, Le Chang, and Xiaodi Wu

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 313, 38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024)

Abstract
Because of the probabilistic/nondeterministic behavior of quantum programs, it is highly advisable to verify them formally to ensure that they correctly implement their specifications. Formal verification, however, also traditionally requires significant effort. To address this challenge, we present Qafny, an automated proof system based on the program verifier Dafny and designed for verifying quantum programs. At its core, Qafny uses a type-guided quantum proof system that translates quantum operations to classical array operations modeled within a classical separation logic framework. We prove the soundness and completeness of our proof system and implement a prototype compiler that transforms Qafny programs and specifications into Dafny for automated verification purposes. We then illustrate the utility of Qafny’s automated capabilities in efficiently verifying important quantum algorithms, including quantum-walk algorithms, Grover’s algorithm, and Shor’s algorithm.
Cite as

Liyi Li, Mingwei Zhu, Rance Cleaveland, Alexander Nicolellis, Yi Lee, Le Chang, and Xiaodi Wu. Qafny: A Quantum-Program Verifier. In 38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 313, pp. 24:1-24:31, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.24,
  author =	{Li, Liyi and Zhu, Mingwei and Cleaveland, Rance and Nicolellis, Alexander and Lee, Yi and Chang, Le and Wu, Xiaodi},
  title =	{{Qafny: A Quantum-Program Verifier}},
  booktitle =	{38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024)},
  pages =	{24:1--24:31},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-341-6},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{313},
  editor =	{Aldrich, Jonathan and Salvaneschi, Guido},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.24},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-208735},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.24},
  annote =	{Keywords: Quantum Computing, Automated Verification, Separation Logic}
}
Document
Artifact
DOI: 10.4230/DARTS.10.2.12
Qafny: A Quantum-Program Verifier (Artifact)

Authors: Liyi Li, Mingwei Zhu, Rance Cleaveland, Alexander Nicolellis, Yi Lee, Le Chang, and Xiaodi Wu

Published in: DARTS, Volume 10, Issue 2, Special Issue of the 38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024)

Abstract
This artifact contains the Coq theory files for the Qafny proof system, including the formalism of the Qafny syntax, semantics, type system, and proof system, with the theorem proofs of type soundness, proof system soundness and completeness. It also contains a the compiled Dafny example programs generated from our Qafny-to-Dafny prototype compiler. These example programs serve as the validations of our Qafny-to-Dafny prototype compiler mechanism. The main work is introduced in the Qafny paper, which develops a separation logic style verification framework for quantum programs.
Cite as

Liyi Li, Mingwei Zhu, Rance Cleaveland, Alexander Nicolellis, Yi Lee, Le Chang, and Xiaodi Wu. Qafny: A Quantum-Program Verifier (Artifact). In Special Issue of the 38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024). Dagstuhl Artifacts Series (DARTS), Volume 10, Issue 2, pp. 12:1-12:2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@Article{li_et_al:DARTS.10.2.12,
  author =	{Li, Liyi and Zhu, Mingwei and Cleaveland, Rance and Nicolellis, Alexander and Lee, Yi and Chang, Le and Wu, Xiaodi},
  title =	{{Qafny: A Quantum-Program Verifier (Artifact)}},
  pages =	{12:1--12:2},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Artifacts Series},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-342-3},
  ISSN =	{2509-8195},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{10},
  number =	{2},
  editor =	{Li, Liyi and Zhu, Mingwei and Cleaveland, Rance and Nicolellis, Alexander and Lee, Yi and Chang, Le and Wu, Xiaodi},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DARTS.10.2.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-209104},
  doi =		{10.4230/DARTS.10.2.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Quantum Computing, Automated Verification, Separation Logic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2024.9
Verifying Peephole Rewriting in SSA Compiler IRs

Authors: Siddharth Bhat, Alex Keizer, Chris Hughes, Andrés Goens, and Tobias Grosser

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 309, 15th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2024)

Abstract
There is an increasing need for domain-specific reasoning in modern compilers. This has fueled the use of tailored intermediate representations (IRs) based on static single assignment (SSA), like in the MLIR compiler framework. Interactive theorem provers (ITPs) provide strong guarantees for the end-to-end verification of compilers (e.g., CompCert). However, modern compilers and their IRs evolve at a rate that makes proof engineering alongside them prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, well-scoped push-button automated verification tools such as the Alive peephole verifier for LLVM-IR gained recognition in domains where SMT solvers offer efficient (semi) decision procedures. In this paper, we aim to combine the convenience of automation with the versatility of ITPs for verifying peephole rewrites across domain-specific IRs. We formalize a core calculus for SSA-based IRs that is generic over the IR and covers so-called regions (nested scoping used by many domain-specific IRs in the MLIR ecosystem). Our mechanization in the Lean proof assistant provides a user-friendly frontend for translating MLIR syntax into our calculus. We provide scaffolding for defining and verifying peephole rewrites, offering tactics to eliminate the abstraction overhead of our SSA calculus. We prove correctness theorems about peephole rewriting, as well as two classical program transformations. To evaluate our framework, we consider three use cases from the MLIR ecosystem that cover different levels of abstractions: (1) bitvector rewrites from LLVM, (2) structured control flow, and (3) fully homomorphic encryption. We envision that our mechanization provides a foundation for formally verified rewrites on new domain-specific IRs.
Cite as

Siddharth Bhat, Alex Keizer, Chris Hughes, Andrés Goens, and Tobias Grosser. Verifying Peephole Rewriting in SSA Compiler IRs. In 15th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 309, pp. 9:1-9:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{bhat_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2024.9,
  author =	{Bhat, Siddharth and Keizer, Alex and Hughes, Chris and Goens, Andr\'{e}s and Grosser, Tobias},
  title =	{{Verifying Peephole Rewriting in SSA Compiler IRs}},
  booktitle =	{15th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2024)},
  pages =	{9:1--9:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-337-9},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{309},
  editor =	{Bertot, Yves and Kutsia, Temur and Norrish, Michael},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2024.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-207372},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2024.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: compilers, semantics, mechanization, MLIR, SSA, regions, peephole rewrites}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2021.21
Proving Quantum Programs Correct

Authors: Kesha Hietala, Robert Rand, Shih-Han Hung, Liyi Li, and Michael Hicks

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 193, 12th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2021)

Abstract
As quantum computing progresses steadily from theory into practice, programmers will face a common problem: How can they be sure that their code does what they intend it to do? This paper presents encouraging results in the application of mechanized proof to the domain of quantum programming in the context of the SQIR development. It verifies the correctness of a range of a quantum algorithms including Grover’s algorithm and quantum phase estimation, a key component of Shor’s algorithm. In doing so, it aims to highlight both the successes and challenges of formal verification in the quantum context and motivate the theorem proving community to target quantum computing as an application domain.
Cite as

Kesha Hietala, Robert Rand, Shih-Han Hung, Liyi Li, and Michael Hicks. Proving Quantum Programs Correct. In 12th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 193, pp. 21:1-21:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{hietala_et_al:LIPIcs.ITP.2021.21,
  author =	{Hietala, Kesha and Rand, Robert and Hung, Shih-Han and Li, Liyi and Hicks, Michael},
  title =	{{Proving Quantum Programs Correct}},
  booktitle =	{12th International Conference on Interactive Theorem Proving (ITP 2021)},
  pages =	{21:1--21:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-188-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{193},
  editor =	{Cohen, Liron and Kaliszyk, Cezary},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2021.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-139160},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITP.2021.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Formal Verification, Quantum Computing, Proof Engineering}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2020.7
K-LLVM: A Relatively Complete Semantics of LLVM IR

Authors: Liyi Li and Elsa L. Gunter

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 166, 34th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2020)

Abstract
LLVM [Lattner and Adve, 2004] is designed for the compile-time, link-time and run-time optimization of programs written in various programming languages. The language supported by LLVM targeted by modern compilers is LLVM IR [llvm.org, 2018]. In this paper we define K-LLVM, a reference semantics for LLVM IR. To the best of our knowledge, K-LLVM is the most complete formal LLVM IR semantics to date, including all LLVM IR instructions, intrinsic functions in the LLVM documentation and Standard-C library functions that are necessary to execute many LLVM IR programs. Additionally, K-LLVM formulates an abstract machine that executes all LLVM IR instructions. The machine allows to describe our formal semantics in terms of simulating a conceptual virtual machine that runs LLVM IR programs, including non-deterministic programs. Even though the K-LLVM memory model in this paper is assumed to be a sequentially consistent memory model and does not include all LLVM concurrency memory behaviors, the design of K-LLVM’s data layout allows the K-LLVM abstract machine to execute some LLVM IR programs that previous semantics did not cover, such as the full range of LLVM IR behaviors for the interaction among LLVM IR casting, pointer arithmetic, memory operations and some memory flags (e.g. readonly) of function headers. Additionally, the memory model is modularized in a manner that supports investigating other memory models. To validate K-LLVM, we have implemented it in 𝕂 [Roşu, 2016], which generated an interpreter for LLVM IR. Using this, we ran tests including 1,385 unit test programs and around 3,000 concrete LLVM IR programs, and K-LLVM passed all of them.
Cite as

Liyi Li and Elsa L. Gunter. K-LLVM: A Relatively Complete Semantics of LLVM IR. In 34th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 166, pp. 7:1-7:29, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020)

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@InProceedings{li_et_al:LIPIcs.ECOOP.2020.7,
  author =	{Li, Liyi and Gunter, Elsa L.},
  title =	{{K-LLVM: A Relatively Complete Semantics of LLVM IR}},
  booktitle =	{34th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2020)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:29},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-154-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2020},
  volume =	{166},
  editor =	{Hirschfeld, Robert and Pape, Tobias},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2020.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-131649},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2020.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: LLVM, formal semantics, K framework, memory model, abstract machine}
}
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