On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms

Authors Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, Rakesh Vohra

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Birgit Heydenreich
Rudolf Müller
Marc Uetz
Rakesh Vohra

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Birgit Heydenreich, Rudolf Müller, Marc Uetz, and Rakesh Vohra. On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue equivalence are immediate consequences.
  • Mechanism Design
  • Revenue Equivalence
  • Graph Theory


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