Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus

Moulin, Hervé

doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16

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Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus

Author Hervé Moulin

Part of: Volume: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271
Part of: Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Publication Date: 2007-10-02

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DagSemProc.07271.16.pdf

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Document Identifiers

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11608

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Keywords

VCG mechanisms
assignment
asymptotic budget balance
worst case analysis

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Abstract

A VCG mechanism to assign p identical objects is feasible is cash transfers yield no deficit. The efficiency loss of such a mechanism is the worst ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus. We compute the optimal efficiency loss for all n and p, when we also require Voluntary Participation as well as when we do not. Without the VP requirement, the optimal efficiency loss converges to zero uniformly in p, and exponentially fast if p is fixed. With the VP requirement asymptotic budget balance is only true is p is not larger than n/2.

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Hervé Moulin. Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, pp. 1-12, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007) https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07271.16

Author Details

Hervé Moulin

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