License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers

Authors Elmar Wolfstetter, Thomas Giebe

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Elmar Wolfstetter
Thomas Giebe

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Elmar Wolfstetter and Thomas Giebe. License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7271, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


This paper revisits the licensing of a non--drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed--fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.
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