Civitas is the first implementation of a coercion-resistant, universally verifiable, remote voting scheme. This paper describes the design of Civitas, details the cryptographic protocols used in its construction, and illustrates how language-enforced information-flow security policies yield assurance in the implementation. The performance of Civitas scales well in the number of voters and offers reasonable tradeoffs between time, cost, and security. These results suggest that secure electronic voting is achievable. The name of this system as presented at Dagstuhl was CIVS. In August 2007, the name was changed to Civitas. For more information, see the Civitas website at http://www.cs.cornell.edu/projects/civitas.
@InProceedings{clarkson_et_al:DagSemProc.07311.5, author = {Clarkson, Michael and Chong, Stephen and Myers, Andrew}, title = {{Civitas: A Secure Remote Voting System}}, booktitle = {Frontiers of Electronic Voting}, pages = {1--47}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2008}, volume = {7311}, editor = {David Chaum and Miroslaw Kutylowski and Ronald L. Rivest and Peter Y. A. Ryan}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.5}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12960}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.07311.5}, annote = {Keywords: Electronic voting, coercion resistance, voter registration, secure bulletin boards, cryptographic protocols} }
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