Document Open Access Logo

Probability Logic and Logical Probability

Author Isaac Levi



PDF
Thumbnail PDF

File

DagSemProc.07351.17.pdf
  • Filesize: 110 kB
  • 27 pages

Document Identifiers

Author Details

Isaac Levi

Cite AsGet BibTex

Isaac Levi. Probability Logic and Logical Probability. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-27, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17

Abstract

Authors like Keynes, H. Jeffreys and Carnap advocated using a concept of "logical probability". Logical probability had the following properties: (a) it was representable as a function from potential states of full belief (or "evidence") to states of subjective or credal probability judgment. (b) Such functions were alleged to be constrained by principles of probability logic. (c) All rational agents were supposed to be obliged to adopt the standard function that probability logic prescribed. In this essay, it is argued that these three requirements could be satisfied only if probability logic prescribed that credal probability should be numerically determinate. Keynes denied that it should numerically determinate and Carnap abandoned the idea that probability logic could supply a determinate function from states of full belief to numerically determinate credal states that all rational agents ought to adopt. The paper explains that once this is conceded, logical probability ought to be interpreted rather differently than it is customarily is.
Keywords
  • Probability
  • full belief
  • logic
  • evidence

Metrics

  • Access Statistics
  • Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
    0
    PDF Downloads
Questions / Remarks / Feedback
X

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing


Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail