Volume

Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351

Publication Details

  • published at: 2007-11-20
  • Publisher: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik

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Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.1
07351 Abstracts Collection – Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents

Authors: Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande, Jérôme Lang, and Hans Rott

Abstract
From 26.08. to 30.08.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07351 ``Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents'' was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
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Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande, Jérôme Lang, and Hans Rott. 07351 Abstracts Collection – Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{bonanno_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.1,
  author =	{Bonanno, Giacomo and Delgrande, James and Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Rott, Hans},
  title =	{{07351 Abstracts Collection – Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--18},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12414},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief change, rational agents, information economy, information processing}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.2
07351 Executive Summary – Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents

Authors: Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande, Jérôme Lang, and Hans Rott

Abstract
From August 26, 2007 to August 30, 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07351 "Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents" was held at the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. The Executive Summary describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in the Proceedings. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
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Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande, Jérôme Lang, and Hans Rott. 07351 Executive Summary – Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-6, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{bonanno_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.2,
  author =	{Bonanno, Giacomo and Delgrande, James and Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Rott, Hans},
  title =	{{07351 Executive Summary – Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--6},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12018},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, iterated belief revision, update, merging, dynamic logic, epistemic logic,conditionals, social choice, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.3
A blueprint for deontic logic in three (not necessarily easy) steps

Authors: Krister Segerberg

Abstract
The famous AGM paradigm for the analysis of theory change drew its inspiration from two sources: belief change and norm change. But very early on, interest in the former eclipsed the interest in the latter. Now, many years later, it is appropriate once again to raise the question about norm change. In the author’s terminology, given the current work in Dynamic Doxastic Logic, what might Dynamic Deontic Logic look like?
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Krister Segerberg. A blueprint for deontic logic in three (not necessarily easy) steps. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{segerberg:DagSemProc.07351.3,
  author =	{Segerberg, Krister},
  title =	{{A blueprint for deontic logic in three (not necessarily easy) steps}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12187},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief change, norm change, Dynamic Doxastic Logic, Dynamic Deontic Logic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.4
A conceptual framework for (iterated) revision, update, and nonmonotonic reasoning

Authors: Gabriele Kern-Isberner

Abstract
This paper makes a foundational contribution to the discussions on the very nature of belief change operations. Belief revision and belief update are investigated within an abstract framework of epistemic states and (qualitative or quantitative) conditionals. Moreover, we distinguish between background knowledge and contextual information in order to analyse belief change more appropriately. The rich epistemic representation framework allows us to make a clear conceptual distinction between revision and update on the one side, while revealing structural similarities on the other side. We propose generic postulates for revision and update that also apply to iterated change. Furthermore, we complete the unifying picture by introducing universal inference operations as a proper counterpart in nonmonotonic reasoning to iterated belief change.
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Gabriele Kern-Isberner. A conceptual framework for (iterated) revision, update, and nonmonotonic reasoning. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{kernisberner:DagSemProc.07351.4,
  author =	{Kern-Isberner, Gabriele},
  title =	{{A conceptual framework for (iterated) revision, update, and nonmonotonic reasoning}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.4},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12082},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.4},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, belief update, nonmonotonic inference, epistemic states, conditionals}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.5
A logical formalism for the subjective approach in a multi-agent setting

Authors: Guillaume Aucher

Abstract
Representing an epistemic situation involving several agents depends very much on the modeling point of view one takes. In fact, the interpretation of a formalism relies quite a lot on the nature of this modeling point of view. Classically, in epistemic logic, the models built are supposed to represent the situation from an external and objective point of view. We call this modeling approach the objective approach. In this paper, we study the modeling point of view of a particular agent involved in the situation with other agents. We propose a logical formalism based on epistemic logic that this agent can use to represent `for herself' the surrounding world. We call this modeling approach the subjective approach. We then set some formal connections between the subjective approach and the objective approach. Finally we axiomatize our logical formalism and show that the resulting logic is decidable.
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Guillaume Aucher. A logical formalism for the subjective approach in a multi-agent setting. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{aucher:DagSemProc.07351.5,
  author =	{Aucher, Guillaume},
  title =	{{A logical formalism for the subjective approach in a multi-agent setting}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.5},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12002},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.5},
  annote =	{Keywords: Epistemic logic, multi-agent system}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.6
A Method for Reasoning about other Agents' Beliefs from Observations

Authors: Alexander Nittka and Richard Booth

Abstract
Traditional work in belief revision deals with the question of what an agent should believe upon receiving new information. We will give an overview about what can be concluded about an agent based on an observation of its belief revision behaviour. The observation contains partial information about the revision inputs received by the agent and its beliefs upon receiving them. We will sketch a method for reasoning about past and future beliefs of the agent and predicting which inputs it accepts and rejects. The focus of this talk will be on different degrees of incompleteness of the observation and variants of the general question we are able to deal with.
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Alexander Nittka and Richard Booth. A Method for Reasoning about other Agents' Beliefs from Observations. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{nittka_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.6,
  author =	{Nittka, Alexander and Booth, Richard},
  title =	{{A Method for Reasoning about other Agents' Beliefs from Observations}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--5},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.6},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12148},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.6},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, iterated revision, non-prioritised revision, non-monotonic reasoning, rational closure, rational explanation}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.7
Belief Change and Cryptographic Protocol Verification

Authors: Aaron Hunter and James Delgrande

Abstract
Cryptographic protocols are structured sequences of messages that are used for exchanging information in a hostile environment. Many protocols have epistemic goals: a successful run of the protocol is intended to cause a participant to hold certain beliefs. As such, epistemic logics have been employed for the verification of cryptographic protocols. Although this approach to verification is explicitly concerned with changing beliefs, formal belief change operators have not been incorporated in previous work. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to protocol verification by combining a monotonic logic with a non-monotonic belief change operator. In this context, a protocol participant is able to retract beliefs in response to new information and a protocol participant is able to postulate the most plausible event explaining new information. We illustrate that this kind of reasoning is particularly important when protocol participants have incorrect beliefs.
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Aaron Hunter and James Delgrande. Belief Change and Cryptographic Protocol Verification. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{hunter_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.7,
  author =	{Hunter, Aaron and Delgrande, James},
  title =	{{Belief Change and Cryptographic Protocol Verification}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12065},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief change, belief evolution, cryptographic protocol verification}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.8
Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging and voting

Authors: Dov Gabbay, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Odinaldo Rodrigues

Abstract
In this paper, we consider a number of different ways of reasoning about voting as a problem of conciliating contradictory interests. The mechanisms that do the reconciliation are belief revision and belief merging. By investigating the relationship between different voting strategies and their associated counterparts in revision theory, we find that whereas the counting mechanism of the voting process is more easily done at the meta-level in belief merging, it can be brought to the object level in base revision. In the former case, the counting can be tweaked according to the aggregation procedure used, whereas in base revision, we can only rely on the notion of minimal change and hence the syntactical representation of the voters' preferences plays a crucial part in the process. This highlights the similarities between the revision approaches on the one hand and voting on the other, but also opens up a number of interesting questions.
Cite as

Dov Gabbay, Gabriella Pigozzi, and Odinaldo Rodrigues. Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging and voting. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{gabbay_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.8,
  author =	{Gabbay, Dov and Pigozzi, Gabriella and Rodrigues, Odinaldo},
  title =	{{Common Foundations for belief revision, belief merging and voting}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--16},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12172},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, belief merging, voting, social choice theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.9
Distance Semantics for Relevance-Sensitive Belief Revision

Authors: Pavlos Peppas, Samir Chopra, and Norman Foo

Abstract
Parikh's axiom (P) for relevance-sensitive belief revision is studied. Sound and complete semantics for axiom (P) is provided in the form constraints on system-of-spheres.
Cite as

Pavlos Peppas, Samir Chopra, and Norman Foo. Distance Semantics for Relevance-Sensitive Belief Revision. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{peppas_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.9,
  author =	{Peppas, Pavlos and Chopra, Samir and Foo, Norman},
  title =	{{Distance Semantics for Relevance-Sensitive Belief Revision}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.9},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12159},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.9},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief Revision, System of Spheres.}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.10
Dynamic Interactions Between Goals and Beliefs

Authors: Steven Shapiro and Gerhard Brewka

Abstract
Shapiro et al. [2005], presented a framework for representing goal change in the situation calculus. In that framework, agents adopt a goal when requested to do so (by some agent reqr), and they remain committed to the goal unless the request is cancelled by reqr. A common assumption in the agent theory literature, is that achievement goals that are believed to be impossible to achieve should be dropped. In this paper, we incorporate this assumption into Shapiro et al.'s framework, however we go a step further. If an agent believes a goal is impossible to achieve, it is dropped. However, if the agent later believes that it was mistaken about the impossibility of achieving the goal, the agent might readopt the goal. In addition, we consider an agent's goals as a whole when making them compatible with their beliefs, rather than considering them individually.
Cite as

Steven Shapiro and Gerhard Brewka. Dynamic Interactions Between Goals and Beliefs. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-9, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{shapiro_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.10,
  author =	{Shapiro, Steven and Brewka, Gerhard},
  title =	{{Dynamic Interactions Between Goals and Beliefs}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--9},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-11995},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Goal Change, Belief Change, Situation Calculus}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.11
Enhanced Contraction and (In)dependence Preliminary report

Authors: Alexander Bochman

Abstract
We introduce a number of contraction operations that allow us to preserve more information in the process of belief contraction and revision of our epistemic states. One of them, choice contraction, will be argued to characterise basic (in)dependence relations among propositions belonging to the epistemic state.
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Alexander Bochman. Enhanced Contraction and (In)dependence Preliminary report. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{bochman:DagSemProc.07351.11,
  author =	{Bochman, Alexander},
  title =	{{Enhanced Contraction and (In)dependence Preliminary report}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--4},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12049},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Contractions, dependence}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.12
Forgetting and Update – an exploration

Authors: Abhaya Nayak, Yin Chen, and Fangzhen Lin

Abstract
Knowledge Update (respectively Erasure) and Forgetting are two very different concepts, with very different underlying motivation. Both are tools for knowledge management; however while the former is meant for accommodating new knowledge into a knowledge corpus, the latter is meant for modifying – in fact reducing the expressivity – of the underlying language. In this paper we show that there is an intimate connection between these two concepts: a particular form of knowledge update and literal forgetting are inter-definable. This connection is exploited to enhance both our understanding of update as well as forgetting in this paper.
Cite as

Abhaya Nayak, Yin Chen, and Fangzhen Lin. Forgetting and Update – an exploration. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{nayak_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.12,
  author =	{Nayak, Abhaya and Chen, Yin and Lin, Fangzhen},
  title =	{{Forgetting and Update – an exploration}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.12},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12131},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.12},
  annote =	{Keywords: Knowledge Update, Erasure, Forgetting, Dalal Distance, Winslett Distance.}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.13
From belief change to preference change

Authors: Jérôme Lang and Leendert van der Torre

Abstract
There is a huge literature on belief change. In contrast, preference change has been considered only in a few recent papers. There are reasons for that: while there is to some extent a general agreement about the very meaning of belief change, this is definitely not so for preference change. We discuss here the possible meanings of preference change, arguing that we should at least distinguish between four paradigms: preferences evolving after some new fact has been learned, preferences evolving as a result of an evolution of the world, preferences evolving after the rational agent itself evolves, and preferences evolving per se. We then develop in more detail the first of these four paradigms (which we think is the most natural). We give some natural properties that we think preference change should fulfill and define several families of preference change operators, parameterized by a revision function on epistemic states and a semantics for interpreting preferences over formulas.
Cite as

Jérôme Lang and Leendert van der Torre. From belief change to preference change. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{lang_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.13,
  author =	{Lang, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and van der Torre, Leendert},
  title =	{{From belief change to preference change}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.13},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12099},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.13},
  annote =	{Keywords: Beliefs, preferences, decision making, agents, preference revision}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.14
Measuring Ranks via the Complete Laws of Iterated Contraction

Authors: Wolfgang Spohn

Abstract
Ranking theory delivers an account of iterated contraction; each ranking function induces a specific iterated contraction behavior. The paper gives a complete axiomatization of that behavior, i.e., a complete set of laws of iterated contraction. It does so by showing how to reconstruct a ranking function from its iterated contraction behavior uniquely up to multi-plicative constant and thus how to measure ranks on a ratio scale.
Cite as

Wolfgang Spohn. Measuring Ranks via the Complete Laws of Iterated Contraction. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{spohn:DagSemProc.07351.14,
  author =	{Spohn, Wolfgang},
  title =	{{Measuring Ranks via the Complete Laws of Iterated Contraction}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--19},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.14},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12398},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.14},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking theory, iterated contraction, measurement theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.15
Optimal Regression for Reasoning about Knowledge and Actions

Authors: Hans van Ditmarsch, Andreas Herzig, and Tiago de Lima

Abstract
We show how in the propositional case both Reiter's and Scherl & Levesque's solutions to the frame problem can be modelled in dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), and provide an optimal regression algorithm for the latter. Our method is as follows: we extend Reiter's framework by integrating observation actions and modal operators of knowledge, and encode the resulting formalism in DEL with announcement and assignment operators. By extending Lutz' recent satisfiability-preserving reduction to our logic, we establish optimal decision procedures for both Reiter's and Scherl & Levesque's approaches: satisfiability is NP-complete for one agent, PSPACE-complete for multiple agents and EXPTIME-complete when common knowledge is involved.
Cite as

Hans van Ditmarsch, Andreas Herzig, and Tiago de Lima. Optimal Regression for Reasoning about Knowledge and Actions. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{vanditmarsch_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.15,
  author =	{van Ditmarsch, Hans and Herzig, Andreas and de Lima, Tiago},
  title =	{{Optimal Regression for Reasoning about Knowledge and Actions}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--22},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.15},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12077},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.15},
  annote =	{Keywords: Reasoning about action and change, reasoning about knowledge, situation calculus, frame problem, dynamic epistemic logic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.16
Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation

Authors: Gabriella Pigozzi and Leendert van der Torre

Abstract
Judgment aggregation studies how agent opinions on logically interconnected propositions can be mapped into a collective judgment on the same propositions, and is plagued by impossibility results. In this paper we study the central notion of independence in these impossibility results. First, we argue that the distinction between the premises and conclusions play an important role in the benchmark examples of judgment aggregation. Second, we consider the notion of independence in judgment aggregation frameworks, and we observe that the distinction between premises and conclusion is not taken into account. Third, based on our analysis, we introduce independence assumptions that distinguish premises from conclusion. We show that, by introducing new operators that satisfy our independence assumptions, the problematic impossibility results no longer hold.
Cite as

Gabriella Pigozzi and Leendert van der Torre. Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-8, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{pigozzi_et_al:DagSemProc.07351.16,
  author =	{Pigozzi, Gabriella and van der Torre, Leendert},
  title =	{{Premise Independence in Judgment Aggregation}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--8},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.16},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12161},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.16},
  annote =	{Keywords: Judgment aggregation, social choice theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17
Probability Logic and Logical Probability

Authors: Isaac Levi

Abstract
Authors like Keynes, H. Jeffreys and Carnap advocated using a concept of "logical probability". Logical probability had the following properties: (a) it was representable as a function from potential states of full belief (or "evidence") to states of subjective or credal probability judgment. (b) Such functions were alleged to be constrained by principles of probability logic. (c) All rational agents were supposed to be obliged to adopt the standard function that probability logic prescribed. In this essay, it is argued that these three requirements could be satisfied only if probability logic prescribed that credal probability should be numerically determinate. Keynes denied that it should numerically determinate and Carnap abandoned the idea that probability logic could supply a determinate function from states of full belief to numerically determinate credal states that all rational agents ought to adopt. The paper explains that once this is conceded, logical probability ought to be interpreted rather differently than it is customarily is.
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Isaac Levi. Probability Logic and Logical Probability. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{levi:DagSemProc.07351.17,
  author =	{Levi, Isaac},
  title =	{{Probability Logic and Logical Probability}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--27},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12105},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.17},
  annote =	{Keywords: Probability, full belief, logic, evidence}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.18
Propositional Relevance through Letter-Sharing: Review and Contribution

Authors: David Makinson

Abstract
The concept of relevance between classical propositional formulae, defined in terms of letter-sharing, has been around for a very long time. But it began to take on a fresh life in 1999 when it was reconsidered in the context of the logic of belief change. Two new ideas appeared in independent work of Odinaldo Rodrigues and Rohit Parikh. First, the relation of relevance was considered modulo the belief set under consideration, Second, the belief set was put in a canonical form, known as its finest splitting. In this paper we explain these ideas; relate the approaches of Rodrigues and Parikh to each other; and briefly report some recent results of Kourousias and Makinson on the extent to which AGM belief change operations respect relevance. Finally we suggest a further refinement of the notion of relevance by introducing a parameter that allows one to take epistemic as well as purely logical components into account.
Cite as

David Makinson. Propositional Relevance through Letter-Sharing: Review and Contribution. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{makinson:DagSemProc.07351.18,
  author =	{Makinson, David},
  title =	{{Propositional Relevance through Letter-Sharing: Review and Contribution}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--13},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.18},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12124},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.18},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief change, relevance, letter-sharing, splitting}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.19
Ranking Revision Reloaded

Authors: Emil Weydert

Abstract
In the context of a general revision framework, we propose and take a first look at revision strategies for epistemic ranking measures reaching beyond minimal Jeffrey-conditionalization, a variant of Spohn-style revision.
Cite as

Emil Weydert. Ranking Revision Reloaded. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-7, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{weydert:DagSemProc.07351.19,
  author =	{Weydert, Emil},
  title =	{{Ranking Revision Reloaded}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--7},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.19},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12020},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.19},
  annote =	{Keywords: Ranking measures, iterated belief revision}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.20
Semantic structures for one-stage and iterated belief revision

Authors: Giacomo Bonanno

Abstract
Semantic structures for belief revision and iterated belief revision are proposed. We start with one-stage revision structures that generalize the notion of choice function from rational choice theory. A correspondence between these one-stage structures and AGM belief revision functions is established. We then add branching time and consider more general structures that accommodate iterated revision. AGM temporal belief revision structures are defined and a syntactic axiomatization is provided.
Cite as

Giacomo Bonanno. Semantic structures for one-stage and iterated belief revision. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{bonanno:DagSemProc.07351.20,
  author =	{Bonanno, Giacomo},
  title =	{{Semantic structures for one-stage and iterated belief revision}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--14},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.20},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12052},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.20},
  annote =	{Keywords: Iterated belief revision, choice functions, Kripke semantics, branching time, modal logic}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.21
The Logic of Bargaining

Authors: Dongmo Zhang

Abstract
This paper reexamines the game-theoretic bargaining theory from logic and Artificial Intelligence perspectives. We present an axiomatic characterization of the logical solutions to bargaining problems. A bargaining situation is described in propositional logic with numerical representation of bargainers' preferences. A solution to the n-person bargaining problems is proposed based on the maxmin rule over the degrees of bargainers' satisfaction. The solution is uniquely characterized by four axioms collective rationality, scale invariance, symmetry and mutually comparable monotonicity in conjunction with three other fundamental assumptions individual rationality, consistency and comprehensiveness. The Pareto efficient solutions are characterized by the axioms scale invariance, Pareto optimality and restricted mutually comparable monotonicity along with the basic assumptions. The relationships of these axioms and assumptions and their links to belief revision postulates and game theory axioms are discussed. The framework would help us to identify the logical reasoning behind bargaining processes and would initiate a new methodology of bargaining analysis.
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Dongmo Zhang. The Logic of Bargaining. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-34, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{zhang:DagSemProc.07351.21,
  author =	{Zhang, Dongmo},
  title =	{{The Logic of Bargaining}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--34},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.21},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12031},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.21},
  annote =	{Keywords: Bargaining theory, belief revision, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.22
Two-Dimensional Belief Change

Authors: Hans Rott

Abstract
The idea of two-dimensional belief change operators is that a belief state is transformed by an input sentence $A$ in such a way that $A$ gets accepted with at least the strength or certainty of a sentence $B$ (the reference sentence). The input of such a transformation may alternatively be conceived as `$B leq A$' [`$B$ less-than-or-equal-to $A$']. This notation makes explicit that the process induced is basically one of doxastic preference change. The principal case of two-dimensional belief change obtains when $B$ is a prior belief which is more strongly accepted than both $A$ and $ eg A$, but the non-principal cases are interesting in their own right. Various two-dimensional revision operators were studied by Cantwell (1997, `raising' and `lowering'), Fermé and Rott (2003, `revision by comparison'), and Rott (2007, `bounded revision'). Special choices of a fixed input sentence $A$ or a fixed reference sentence $B$ lead to some well-known unary oparators of belief change: `irrevocable' (aka `radical') revision, `severe withdrawal' (aka `mild contraction'), `natural' (aka `conservative') and `lexicographic' (aka `moderate') revision. The talk gives a survey of several variants of two-dimensional belief change and their representations. I argue that two-dimensional belief change operators offer an interesting qualitative model with an expressive power between (all too poor) unary operators and (all too demanding) quantitative models of belief change.
Cite as

Hans Rott. Two-Dimensional Belief Change. In Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7351, pp. 1-27, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)

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@InProceedings{rott:DagSemProc.07351.22,
  author =	{Rott, Hans},
  title =	{{Two-Dimensional Belief Change}},
  booktitle =	{Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents},
  pages =	{1--27},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  year =	{2007},
  volume =	{7351},
  editor =	{Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande and J\'{e}r\^{o}me Lang and Hans Rott},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.22},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12404},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagSemProc.07351.22},
  annote =	{Keywords: Belief revision, radical revision, conservative revision, moderate revision, severe withdrawal, preference change, qualitative vs. quantitative change}
}

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