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Verifying Arithmetic Assembly Programs in Cryptographic Primitives (Invited Talk)

Authors Andy Polyakov, Ming-Hsien Tsai, Bow-Yaw Wang, Bo-Yin Yang



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Author Details

Andy Polyakov
  • The OpenSSL project
Ming-Hsien Tsai
  • Academia Sinica, Taiwan
Bow-Yaw Wang
  • Academia Sinica, Taiwan
Bo-Yin Yang
  • Academia Sinica, Taiwan

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Andy Polyakov, Ming-Hsien Tsai, Bow-Yaw Wang, and Bo-Yin Yang. Verifying Arithmetic Assembly Programs in Cryptographic Primitives (Invited Talk). In 29th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 118, pp. 4:1-4:16, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2018.4

Abstract

Arithmetic over large finite fields is indispensable in modern cryptography. For efficienty, these operations are often implemented in manually optimized assembly programs. Since these arithmetic assembly programs necessarily perform lots of non-linear computation, checking their correctness is a challenging verification problem. We develop techniques to verify such programs automatically in this paper. Using our techniques, we have successfully verified a number of assembly programs in OpenSSL. Moreover, our tool verifies the boringSSL Montgomery Ladderstep (about 1400 assembly instructions) in 1 hour. This is by far the fastest verification technique for such programs.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Software and its engineering → Formal software verification
Keywords
  • Formal verification
  • Cryptography
  • Assembly Programs

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