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The Elements of Decision Alignment

Authors Mark S. Miller, Bill Tulloh

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Keywords
  • economics
  • law
  • contracts
  • principal-agent problem
  • incentive alignment
  • least authority
  • verification

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Abstract

When one object makes a request of another, why do we expect that
the second object's behavior correctly satisfies the first object's
wishes? The need to cope with such principal-agent problems
shapes programming practice as much as it shapes human organizations
and economies. However, the literature about such plan coordination
issues among humans is almost disjoint from the literature about
these issues among objects. Even the terms used are unrelated.

These fields have much to learn from each other---both from their
similarities and from the causes of their differences. We propose a
framework for thinking about decision alignment as a bridge
between these disciplines.

Cite As Get BibTex

Mark S. Miller and Bill Tulloh. The Elements of Decision Alignment. In 30th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 56, pp. 17:1-17:5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2016.17

Author Details

Mark S. Miller
Bill Tulloh

References

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