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Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games

Authors Soumya Paul, Sunil Simon

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LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330.pdf
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Keywords
  • Infinite games on graphs
  • Muller games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • subgame perfect equilibrium

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Abstract

We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for
players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In
this context, we look at the standard solution concept of Nash
equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria
always exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and
present a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile. We
also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium when it
exists in such games.

Cite As Get BibTex

Soumya Paul and Sunil Simon. Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 4, pp. 335-346, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009.2330

Author Details

Soumya Paul
Sunil Simon
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