Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games

Authors Soumya Paul, Sunil Simon

Thumbnail PDF


  • Filesize: 119 kB
  • 12 pages

Document Identifiers

Author Details

Soumya Paul
Sunil Simon

Cite AsGet BibTex

Soumya Paul and Sunil Simon. Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science. Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 4, pp. 335-346, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In this context, we look at the standard solution concept of Nash equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria always exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and present a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile. We also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium when it exists in such games.
  • Infinite games on graphs
  • Muller games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • subgame perfect equilibrium


  • Access Statistics
  • Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
    PDF Downloads
Questions / Remarks / Feedback

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail