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Networks of Complements

Authors Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan

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Keywords
  • Complements
  • Pricing
  • Networks
  • Game Theory
  • Price of Stability

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Abstract

We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the pricing game between the sellers. We prove positive and negative results, both of "Price of Anarchy" and of "Price of Stability" type, for special families of graphs (paths, cycles) as well as more general ones (trees, graphs). We describe best-reply dynamics that converge to non-trivial equilibrium in several families of graphs, and we use these dynamics to prove the existence of approximately-efficient equilibria.

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Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Noam Nisan. Networks of Complements. In 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 55, pp. 140:1-140:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2016) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2016.140

Author Details

Moshe Babaioff
Liad Blumrosen
Noam Nisan

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