How Discontinuous is Computing Nash Equilibria? (Extended Abstract)

Pauly, Arno

doi:10.4230/OASIcs.CCA.2009.2271

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How Discontinuous is Computing Nash Equilibria? (Extended Abstract)

Author Arno Pauly

Part of: Volume: 6th International Conference on Computability and Complexity in Analysis (CCA'09) (CCA 2009)
Part of: Series: Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)
License: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported license
Publication Date: 2009-11-25

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DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.CCA.2009.2271
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-22719

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Keywords

Game Theory
computable analysis
Nash equilibrium
discontinuity

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Abstract

We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally, we restrict the treatment to two player games, but results and proofs extend to the $n$-player case. As a side result, the degree of discontinuity of solving systems of linear inequalities is settled.

Cite As Get BibTex

Arno Pauly. How Discontinuous is Computing Nash Equilibria? (Extended Abstract). In 6th International Conference on Computability and Complexity in Analysis (CCA'09). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 11, pp. 197-208, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009) https://doi.org/10.4230/OASIcs.CCA.2009.2271

Author Details

Arno Pauly

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