2 Search Results for "Thomas, Clayton"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2024.32
Characterising and Verifying the Core in Concurrent Multi-Player Mean-Payoff Games

Authors: Julian Gutierrez, Anthony W. Lin, Muhammad Najib, Thomas Steeples, and Michael Wooldridge

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 288, 32nd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2024)

Abstract
Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings, this paper explores an alternative solution concept: the core from cooperative game theory. This concept is particularly relevant for cooperative AI systems, as it enables the modelling of cooperation among agents, even when their goals are not fully aligned. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide a characterisation of the core using discrete geometry techniques and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness. We then use the characterisation to prove the existence of polynomial witnesses in the core. Second, we use the existence of such witnesses to solve key decision problems in rational verification and provide tight complexity bounds for the problem of checking whether some/every equilibrium in a game satisfies a given LTL or GR(1) specification. Our approach is general and can be adapted to handle other specifications expressed in various fragments of LTL without incurring additional computational costs.
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Julian Gutierrez, Anthony W. Lin, Muhammad Najib, Thomas Steeples, and Michael Wooldridge. Characterising and Verifying the Core in Concurrent Multi-Player Mean-Payoff Games. In 32nd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 288, pp. 32:1-32:25, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{gutierrez_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2024.32,
  author =	{Gutierrez, Julian and Lin, Anthony W. and Najib, Muhammad and Steeples, Thomas and Wooldridge, Michael},
  title =	{{Characterising and Verifying the Core in Concurrent Multi-Player Mean-Payoff Games}},
  booktitle =	{32nd EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2024)},
  pages =	{32:1--32:25},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-310-2},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{288},
  editor =	{Murano, Aniello and Silva, Alexandra},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2024.32},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-196752},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2024.32},
  annote =	{Keywords: Concurrent games, multi-agent systems, temporal logic, game theory}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46
Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity

Authors: Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi, Clayton Thomas, and Geng Zhao

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 185, 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)

Abstract
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. Agents on each side of the market are divided into a constant number of "soft" tiers, which capture agents' qualities. Specifically, every agent within a tier has the same public score, and agents on each side have preferences independently generated proportionally to the public scores of the other side. We compute the expected average rank which agents in each tier have for their partners in the man-optimal stable matching, and prove concentration results for the average rank in asymptotically large markets. Furthermore, despite having a significant effect on ranks, public scores do not strongly influence the probability of an agent matching to a given tier of the other side. This generalizes the results by Pittel [Pittel, 1989], which analyzed markets with uniform preferences. The results quantitatively demonstrate the effect of competition due to the heterogeneous attractiveness of agents in the market.
Cite as

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Amin Saberi, Clayton Thomas, and Geng Zhao. Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity. In 12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 185, pp. 46:1-46:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)

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@InProceedings{ashlagi_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46,
  author =	{Ashlagi, Itai and Braverman, Mark and Saberi, Amin and Thomas, Clayton and Zhao, Geng},
  title =	{{Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank Is Proportional to Popularity}},
  booktitle =	{12th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2021)},
  pages =	{46:1--46:16},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-177-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{185},
  editor =	{Lee, James R.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops-dev.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-135851},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2021.46},
  annote =	{Keywords: Stable matching, stable marriage problem, tiered random markets, deferred acceptance}
}
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