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**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 310, 19th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2024)

We study digital signatures with revocation capabilities and show two results. First, we define and construct digital signatures with revocable signing keys from the LWE assumption. In this primitive, the signing key is a quantum state which enables a user to sign many messages and yet, the quantum key is also revocable, i.e., it can be collapsed into a classical certificate which can later be verified. Once the key is successfully revoked, we require that the initial recipient of the key loses the ability to sign. We construct digital signatures with revocable signing keys from a newly introduced primitive which we call two-tier one-shot signatures, which may be of independent interest. This is a variant of one-shot signatures, where the verification of a signature for the message "0" is done publicly, whereas the verification for the message "1" is done in private. We give a construction of two-tier one-shot signatures from the LWE assumption. As a complementary result, we also construct digital signatures with quantum revocation from group actions, where the quantum signing key is simply "returned" and then verified as part of revocation.
Second, we define and construct digital signatures with revocable signatures from OWFs. In this primitive, the signer can produce quantum signatures which can later be revoked. Here, the security property requires that, once revocation is successful, the initial recipient of the signature loses the ability to find accepting inputs to the signature verification algorithm. We construct this primitive using a newly introduced two-tier variant of tokenized signatures. For the construction, we show a new lemma which we call the adaptive hardcore bit property for OWFs, which may enable further applications.

Tomoyuki Morimae, Alexander Poremba, and Takashi Yamakawa. Revocable Quantum Digital Signatures. In 19th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 310, pp. 5:1-5:24, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{morimae_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2024.5, author = {Morimae, Tomoyuki and Poremba, Alexander and Yamakawa, Takashi}, title = {{Revocable Quantum Digital Signatures}}, booktitle = {19th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2024)}, pages = {5:1--5:24}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-328-7}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2024}, volume = {310}, editor = {Magniez, Fr\'{e}d\'{e}ric and Grilo, Alex Bredariol}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2024.5}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-206757}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2024.5}, annote = {Keywords: Quantum cryptography, digital signatures, revocable cryptography} }

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Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games

**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 261, 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)

Quantum mechanical effects have enabled the construction of cryptographic primitives that are impossible classically. For example, quantum copy-protection allows for a program to be encoded in a quantum state in such a way that the program can be evaluated, but not copied. Many of these cryptographic primitives are two-party protocols, where one party, Bob, has full quantum computational capabilities, and the other party, Alice, is only required to send random BB84 states to Bob. In this work, we show how such protocols can generically be converted to ones where Alice is fully classical, assuming that Bob cannot efficiently solve the LWE problem. In particular, this means that all communication between (classical) Alice and (quantum) Bob is classical, yet they can still make use of cryptographic primitives that would be impossible if both parties were classical. We apply this conversion procedure to obtain quantum cryptographic protocols with classical communication for unclonable encryption, copy-protection, computing on encrypted data, and verifiable blind delegated computation.
The key technical ingredient for our result is a protocol for classically-instructed parallel remote state preparation of BB84 states. This is a multi-round protocol between (classical) Alice and (quantum polynomial-time) Bob that allows Alice to certify that Bob must have prepared n uniformly random BB84 states (up to a change of basis on his space). While previous approaches could only certify one- or two-qubit states, our protocol allows for the certification of an n-fold tensor product of BB84 states. Furthermore, Alice knows which specific BB84 states Bob has prepared, while Bob himself does not. Hence, the situation at the end of this protocol is (almost) equivalent to one where Alice sent n random BB84 states to Bob. This allows us to replace the step of preparing and sending BB84 states in existing protocols by our remote-state preparation protocol in a generic and modular way.

Alexandru Gheorghiu, Tony Metger, and Alexander Poremba. Quantum Cryptography with Classical Communication: Parallel Remote State Preparation for Copy-Protection, Verification, and More. In 50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 261, pp. 67:1-67:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{gheorghiu_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.67, author = {Gheorghiu, Alexandru and Metger, Tony and Poremba, Alexander}, title = {{Quantum Cryptography with Classical Communication: Parallel Remote State Preparation for Copy-Protection, Verification, and More}}, booktitle = {50th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2023)}, pages = {67:1--67:17}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-278-5}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2023}, volume = {261}, editor = {Etessami, Kousha and Feige, Uriel and Puppis, Gabriele}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.67}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-181197}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2023.67}, annote = {Keywords: Quantum cryptography, Remote state preparation, Self-testing, Learning with errors, Quantum copy-protection, Unclonable encryption, Quantum verification} }

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**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 251, 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)

Quantum information has the property that measurement is an inherently destructive process. This feature is most apparent in the principle of complementarity, which states that mutually incompatible observables cannot be measured at the same time. Recent work by Broadbent and Islam (TCC 2020) builds on this aspect of quantum mechanics to realize a cryptographic notion called certified deletion. While this remarkable notion enables a classical verifier to be convinced that a (private-key) quantum ciphertext has been deleted by an untrusted party, it offers no additional layer of functionality.
In this work, we augment the proof-of-deletion paradigm with fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We construct the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme with certified deletion - an interactive protocol which enables an untrusted quantum server to compute on encrypted data and, if requested, to simultaneously prove data deletion to a client. Our scheme has the desirable property that verification of a deletion certificate is public; meaning anyone can verify that deletion has taken place. Our main technical ingredient is an interactive protocol by which a quantum prover can convince a classical verifier that a sample from the Learning with Errors (LWE) distribution in the form of a quantum state was deleted. As an application of our protocol, we construct a Dual-Regev public-key encryption scheme with certified deletion, which we then extend towards a (leveled) FHE scheme of the same type. We introduce the notion of Gaussian-collapsing hash functions - a special case of collapsing hash functions defined by Unruh (Eurocrypt 2016) - and we prove the security of our schemes under the assumption that the Ajtai hash function satisfies a certain strong Gaussian-collapsing property in the presence of leakage.

Alexander Poremba. Quantum Proofs of Deletion for Learning with Errors. In 14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 251, pp. 90:1-90:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)

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@InProceedings{poremba:LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.90, author = {Poremba, Alexander}, title = {{Quantum Proofs of Deletion for Learning with Errors}}, booktitle = {14th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2023)}, pages = {90:1--90:14}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-263-1}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2023}, volume = {251}, editor = {Tauman Kalai, Yael}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.90}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-175934}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2023.90}, annote = {Keywords: Learning with errors, certified deletion, fully homomorphic encryption} }

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**Published in:** LIPIcs, Volume 135, 14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2019)

Quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives.
We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key requires a linear number of decryption queries. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones.

Gorjan Alagic, Stacey Jeffery, Maris Ozols, and Alexander Poremba. On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors. In 14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 135, pp. 1:1-1:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019)

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@InProceedings{alagic_et_al:LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1, author = {Alagic, Gorjan and Jeffery, Stacey and Ozols, Maris and Poremba, Alexander}, title = {{On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors}}, booktitle = {14th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography (TQC 2019)}, pages = {1:1--1:23}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-112-2}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2019}, volume = {135}, editor = {van Dam, Wim and Man\v{c}inska, Laura}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-103939}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2019.1}, annote = {Keywords: quantum chosen-ciphertext security, quantum attacks, learning with errors} }

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