2 Search Results for "Aggarwal, Gagan"

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Track A: Algorithms, Complexity and Games

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.71

Low-Memory Algorithms for Online Edge Coloring

Authors: Prantar Ghosh and Manuel Stoeckl

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 297, 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)

Abstract

For edge coloring, the online and the W-streaming models seem somewhat orthogonal: the former needs edges to be assigned colors immediately after insertion, typically without any space restrictions, while the latter limits memory to be sublinear in the input size but allows an edge’s color to be announced any time after its insertion. We aim for the best of both worlds by designing small-space online algorithms for edge coloring. Our online algorithms significantly improve upon the memory used by prior ones while achieving an O(1)-competitive ratio. We study the problem under both (adversarial) edge arrivals and vertex arrivals. Under vertex arrivals of any n-node graph with maximum vertex-degree Δ, our online O(Δ)-coloring algorithm uses only semi-streaming space (i.e., Õ(n) space, where the Õ(.) notation hides polylog(n) factors). Under edge arrivals, we obtain an online O(Δ)-coloring in Õ(n√Δ) space. We also achieve a smooth color-space tradeoff: for any t = O(Δ), we get an O(Δt(log²Δ))-coloring in Õ(n√{Δ/t}) space, improving upon the state of the art that used Õ(nΔ/t) space for the same number of colors. The improvements stem from extensive use of random permutations that enable us to avoid previously used colors. Most of our algorithms can be derandomized and extended to multigraphs, where edge coloring is known to be considerably harder than for simple graphs.

Cite as

Prantar Ghosh and Manuel Stoeckl. Low-Memory Algorithms for Online Edge Coloring. In 51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 297, pp. 71:1-71:19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{ghosh_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.71,
  author =	{Ghosh, Prantar and Stoeckl, Manuel},
  title =	{{Low-Memory Algorithms for Online Edge Coloring}},
  booktitle =	{51st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2024)},
  pages =	{71:1--71:19},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-322-5},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{297},
  editor =	{Bringmann, Karl and Grohe, Martin and Puppis, Gabriele and Svensson, Ola},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.71},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-202146},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2024.71},
  annote =	{Keywords: Edge coloring, streaming model, online algorithms}
}

Document

DOI: 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1

Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries

Authors: Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh, and Andres Perlroth

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 215, 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)

Abstract

We study the mechanism design problem of selling k items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of buyers. Our goal is to design robust mechanisms that are independent of the demand structure (i.e. how the buyers are partitioned across intermediaries), and perform well under a wide variety of possible contracts between intermediaries and buyers. We first consider the case of k identical items where each buyer draws its private valuation for an item i.i.d. from a known λ-regular distribution. We construct a robust mechanism that, independent of the demand structure and under certain conditions on the contracts between intermediaries and buyers, obtains a constant factor of the revenue that the mechanism designer could obtain had she known the buyers' valuations. In other words, our mechanism’s expected revenue achieves a constant factor of the optimal welfare, regardless of the demand structure. Our mechanism is a simple posted-price mechanism that sets a take-it-or-leave-it per-item price that depends on k and the total number of buyers, but does not depend on the demand structure or the downstream contracts. Next we generalize our result to the case when the items are not identical. We assume that the item valuations are separable, i.e. v_{i j} = η_j v_i for buyer i and item j, with each private v_i drawn i.i.d. from a known λ-regular distribution. For this case, we design a mechanism that obtains at least a constant fraction of the optimal welfare, by using a menu of posted prices. This mechanism is also independent of the demand structure, but makes a relatively stronger assumption on the contracts between intermediaries and buyers, namely that each intermediary prefers outcomes with a higher sum of utilities of the subset of buyers represented by it.

Cite as

Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh, and Andres Perlroth. Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries. In 13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 215, pp. 1:1-1:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{aggarwal_et_al:LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1,
  author =	{Aggarwal, Gagan and Bhawalkar, Kshipra and Guruganesh, Guru and Perlroth, Andres},
  title =	{{Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries}},
  booktitle =	{13th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2022)},
  pages =	{1:1--1:22},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-217-4},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{215},
  editor =	{Braverman, Mark},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-155979},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2022.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization, Posted Price Mechanisms}
}

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1 Aggarwal, Gagan
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1 Ghosh, Prantar
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1 Mathematics of computing → Graph coloring
1 Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
1 Theory of computation → Streaming, sublinear and near linear time algorithms

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1 Edge coloring
1 Mechanism Design
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