3 Search Results for "Annenkov, Danil"

Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.2
Formal Specification of the Cardano Blockchain Ledger, Mechanized in Agda

Authors: Andre Knispel, Orestis Melkonian, James Chapman, Alasdair Hill, Joosep Jääger, William DeMeo, and Ulf Norell

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 118, 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)

Abstract
Blockchain systems comprise critical software that handle substantial monetary funds, rendering them excellent candidates for formal verification. One of their core components is the underlying ledger that does all the accounting: keeping track of transactions and their validity, etc. Unfortunately, previous theoretical studies are typically confined to an idealized setting, while specifications for real implementations are scarce; either the functionality is directly implemented without a proper specification, or at best an informal specification is written on paper. The present work expands beyond prior meta-theoretical investigations of the EUTxO model to encompass the full scale of the Cardano blockchain: our formal specification describes a hierarchy of modular transitions that covers all the intricacies of a realistic blockchain, such as fully expressive smart contracts and decentralized governance. It is mechanized in a proof assistant, thus enjoys a higher standard of rigor: type-checking prevents minor oversights that were frequent in previous informal approaches; key meta-theoretical properties can now be formally proven; it is an executable specification against which the implementation in production is being tested for conformance; and it provides firm foundations for smart contract verification. Apart from a safety net to keep us in check, the formalization also provides a guideline for the ledger design: one informs the other in a symbiotic way, especially in the case of state-of-the-art features like decentralized governance, which is an emerging sub-field of blockchain research that however mandates a more exploratory approach. All the results presented in this paper have been mechanized in the Agda proof assistant and are publicly available. In fact, this document is itself a literate Agda script and all rendered code has been successfully type-checked.
Cite as

Andre Knispel, Orestis Melkonian, James Chapman, Alasdair Hill, Joosep Jääger, William DeMeo, and Ulf Norell. Formal Specification of the Cardano Blockchain Ledger, Mechanized in Agda. In 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 118, pp. 2:1-2:18, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{knispel_et_al:OASIcs.FMBC.2024.2,
  author =	{Knispel, Andre and Melkonian, Orestis and Chapman, James and Hill, Alasdair and J\"{a}\"{a}ger, Joosep and DeMeo, William and Norell, Ulf},
  title =	{{Formal Specification of the Cardano Blockchain Ledger, Mechanized in Agda}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:18},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-317-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{118},
  editor =	{Bernardo, Bruno and Marmsoler, Diego},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-198673},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: blockchain, distributed ledgers, UTxO, Cardano, formal verification, Agda}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.7
Towards Formally Specifying and Verifying Smart Contract Upgrades in Coq

Authors: Derek Sorensen

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 118, 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)

Abstract
Smart contract upgrades are costly from a verification perspective and can be a meaningful source of vulnerabilities when done incorrectly. Unfortunately, there is no established, formal framework through which one can reason about contracts as they undergo upgrades, though much work has been done to verify standalone smart contracts. Instead, one must repeat the full verification process for each contract upgrade, something which relies heavily on fallible intuition, can lead to unexpected vulnerabilities, and drives up the cost of formally verifying smart contracts. We propose a formal framework for contract upgrades in ConCert, a Coq-based smart contract verification tool. Central to this framework is our notion of a contract morphism, a theoretical tool which we introduce to formally encode structural relationships between smart contracts, and with which we can formally specify and verify an upgraded contract relative to its previous versions. We argue that ours is a natural framework for specifying and verifying contract upgrades, and hope to offer a first step towards rigorous, efficient specification and verification of contract upgrades.
Cite as

Derek Sorensen. Towards Formally Specifying and Verifying Smart Contract Upgrades in Coq. In 5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 118, pp. 7:1-7:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)

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@InProceedings{sorensen:OASIcs.FMBC.2024.7,
  author =	{Sorensen, Derek},
  title =	{{Towards Formally Specifying and Verifying Smart Contract Upgrades in Coq}},
  booktitle =	{5th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2024)},
  pages =	{7:1--7:14},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-317-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{118},
  editor =	{Bernardo, Bruno and Marmsoler, Diego},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.7},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-198728},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2024.7},
  annote =	{Keywords: smart contract verification, formal methods, interactive theorem prover, smart contract upgrades}
}
Document
DOI: 10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2
Finding Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with ConCert’s Property-Based Testing Framework

Authors: Mikkel Milo, Eske Hoy Nielsen, Danil Annenkov, and Bas Spitters

Published in: OASIcs, Volume 105, 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022)

Abstract
We provide three detailed case studies of vulnerabilities in smart contracts, and show how property based testing would have found them: 1. the Dexter1 token exchange; 2. the iToken; 3. the ICO of Brave’s BAT token. The last example is, in fact, new, and was missed in the auditing process. We have implemented this testing in ConCert, a general executable model/specification of smart contract execution in the Coq proof assistant. ConCert contracts can be used to generate verified smart contracts in Tezos' LIGO and Concordium’s rust language. We thus show the effectiveness of combining formal verification and property-based testing of smart contracts.
Cite as

Mikkel Milo, Eske Hoy Nielsen, Danil Annenkov, and Bas Spitters. Finding Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with ConCert’s Property-Based Testing Framework. In 4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022). Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs), Volume 105, pp. 2:1-2:13, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)

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@InProceedings{milo_et_al:OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2,
  author =	{Milo, Mikkel and Nielsen, Eske Hoy and Annenkov, Danil and Spitters, Bas},
  title =	{{Finding Smart Contract Vulnerabilities with ConCert’s Property-Based Testing Framework}},
  booktitle =	{4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Blockchains (FMBC 2022)},
  pages =	{2:1--2:13},
  series =	{Open Access Series in Informatics (OASIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-250-1},
  ISSN =	{2190-6807},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{105},
  editor =	{Dargaye, Zaynah and Schneidewind, Clara},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-171834},
  doi =		{10.4230/OASIcs.FMBC.2022.2},
  annote =	{Keywords: Smart Contracts, Formal Verification, Property-Based Testing, Coq}
}
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