3 Search Results for "Ben Dov, Yoav"


Document
Are Your Keys Protected? Time Will Tell

Authors: Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 304, 5th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2024)


Abstract
Side channel attacks, and in particular timing attacks, are a fundamental obstacle to obtaining secure implementation of algorithms and cryptographic protocols, and have been widely researched for decades. While cryptographic definitions for the security of cryptographic systems have been well established for decades, none of these accepted definitions take into account the running time information leaked from executing the system. In this work, we give the foundation of new cryptographic definitions for cryptographic systems that take into account information about their leaked running time, focusing mainly on keyed functions such as signature and encryption schemes. Specifically, [(1)] 1) We define several cryptographic properties to express the claim that the timing information does not help an adversary to extract sensitive information, e.g. the key or the queries made. We highlight the definition of key-obliviousness, which means that an adversary cannot tell whether it received the timing of the queries with the actual key or the timing of the same queries with a random key. 2) We present a construction of key-oblivious pseudorandom permutations on a small or medium-sized domain. This construction is not "fixed-time," and at the same time is secure against any number of queries even in case the adversary knows the running time exactly. Our construction, which we call Janus Sometimes Recurse, is a variant of the "Sometimes Recurse" shuffle by Morris and Rogaway. 3) We suggest a new security notion for keyed functions, called noticeable security, and prove that cryptographic schemes that have noticeable security remain secure even when the exact timings are leaked, provided the implementation is key-oblivious. We show that our notion applies to cryptographic signatures, private key encryption and PRPs.

Cite as

Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik. Are Your Keys Protected? Time Will Tell. In 5th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2024). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 304, pp. 3:1-3:28, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@InProceedings{bendov_et_al:LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3,
  author =	{Ben Dov, Yoav and David, Liron and Naor, Moni and Tzalik, Elad},
  title =	{{Are Your Keys Protected? Time Will Tell}},
  booktitle =	{5th Conference on Information-Theoretic Cryptography (ITC 2024)},
  pages =	{3:1--3:28},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-333-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{304},
  editor =	{Aggarwal, Divesh},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-205119},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2024.3},
  annote =	{Keywords: Side channel attacks, Timing attacks, Keyed functions, Key oblivious, Noticeable security}
}
Document
Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 22282)

Authors: James P. Delgrande, Birte Glimm, Thomas Meyer, Miroslaw Truszczynski, and Frank Wolter

Published in: Dagstuhl Manifestos, Volume 10, Issue 1 (2024)


Abstract
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning is a central, longstanding, and active area of Artificial Intelligence. Over the years it has evolved significantly; more recently it has been challenged and complemented by research in areas such as machine learning and reasoning under uncertainty. In July 2022,sser a Dagstuhl Perspectives workshop was held on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. The goal of the workshop was to describe the state of the art in the field, including its relation with other areas, its shortcomings and strengths, together with recommendations for future progress. We developed this manifesto based on the presentations, panels, working groups, and discussions that took place at the Dagstuhl Workshop. It is a declaration of our views on Knowledge Representation: its origins, goals, milestones, and current foci; its relation to other disciplines, especially to Artificial Intelligence; and on its challenges, along with key priorities for the next decade.

Cite as

James P. Delgrande, Birte Glimm, Thomas Meyer, Miroslaw Truszczynski, and Frank Wolter. Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 22282). In Dagstuhl Manifestos, Volume 10, Issue 1, pp. 1-61, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2024)


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@Article{delgrande_et_al:DagMan.10.1.1,
  author =	{Delgrande, James P. and Glimm, Birte and Meyer, Thomas and Truszczynski, Miroslaw and Wolter, Frank},
  title =	{{Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (Dagstuhl Perspectives Workshop 22282)}},
  pages =	{1--61},
  journal =	{Dagstuhl Manifestos},
  ISSN =	{2193-2433},
  year =	{2024},
  volume =	{10},
  number =	{1},
  editor =	{Delgrande, James P. and Glimm, Birte and Meyer, Thomas and Truszczynski, Miroslaw and Wolter, Frank},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagMan.10.1.1},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-201403},
  doi =		{10.4230/DagMan.10.1.1},
  annote =	{Keywords: Knowledge representation and reasoning, Applications of logics, Declarative representations, Formal logic}
}
Document
Resistance to Timing Attacks for Sampling and Privacy Preserving Schemes

Authors: Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 256, 4th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2023)


Abstract
Side channel attacks, and in particular timing attacks, are a fundamental obstacle for secure implementation of algorithms and cryptographic protocols. These attacks and countermeasures have been widely researched for decades. We offer a new perspective on resistance to timing attacks. We focus on sampling algorithms and their application to differential privacy. We define sampling algorithms that do not reveal information about the sampled output through their running time. More specifically: (1) We characterize the distributions that can be sampled from in a "time oblivious" way, meaning that the running time does not leak any information about the output. We provide an optimal algorithm in terms of randomness used to sample for these distributions. We give an example of an efficient randomized algorithm 𝒜 such that there is no subexponential algorithm with the same output as 𝒜 that does not reveal information on the output or the input, therefore we show leaking information on either the input or the output is unavoidable. (2) We consider the impact of timing attacks on (pure) differential privacy mechanisms. It turns out that if the range of the mechanism is unbounded, such as counting, then any time oblivious pure DP mechanism must give a useless output with constant probability (the constant is mechanism dependent) and must have infinite expected running time. We show that up to this limitations it is possible to transform any pure DP mechanism into a time oblivious one.

Cite as

Yoav Ben Dov, Liron David, Moni Naor, and Elad Tzalik. Resistance to Timing Attacks for Sampling and Privacy Preserving Schemes. In 4th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 256, pp. 11:1-11:23, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


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@InProceedings{bendov_et_al:LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11,
  author =	{Ben Dov, Yoav and David, Liron and Naor, Moni and Tzalik, Elad},
  title =	{{Resistance to Timing Attacks for Sampling and Privacy Preserving Schemes}},
  booktitle =	{4th Symposium on Foundations of Responsible Computing (FORC 2023)},
  pages =	{11:1--11:23},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-272-3},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{256},
  editor =	{Talwar, Kunal},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-179329},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.FORC.2023.11},
  annote =	{Keywords: Differential Privacy}
}
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