4 Search Results for "Brice, Léonard"


Document
Rational Verification for Nash and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Graph Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 272, 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023)


Abstract
We study a natural problem about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: rational verification, that consists in deciding whether all the rational answers to a given strategy satisfy some specification. We give the complexities of that problem for two major concepts of rationality: Nash equilibria and subgame-perfect equilibria, and for three major classes of payoff functions: energy, discounted-sum, and mean-payoff.

Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. Rational Verification for Nash and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Graph Games. In 48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 272, pp. 26:1-26:15, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)


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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{Rational Verification for Nash and Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Graph Games}},
  booktitle =	{48th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS 2023)},
  pages =	{26:1--26:15},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-292-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2023},
  volume =	{272},
  editor =	{Leroux, J\'{e}r\^{o}me and Lombardy, Sylvain and Peleg, David},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-185608},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.MFCS.2023.26},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, Nash equilibria, subgame-perfect equilibria}
}
Document
Track B: Automata, Logic, Semantics, and Theory of Programming
The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-Payoff Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 229, 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)


Abstract
We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst case complexity was left open.

Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-Payoff Games. In 49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 229, pp. 116:1-116:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{The Complexity of SPEs in Mean-Payoff Games}},
  booktitle =	{49th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2022)},
  pages =	{116:1--116:20},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-235-8},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{229},
  editor =	{Boja\'{n}czyk, Miko{\l}aj and Merelli, Emanuela and Woodruff, David P.},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-164574},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2022.116},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, subgame-perfect equilibria, mean-payoff objectives}
}
Document
On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 216, 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022)


Abstract
We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the literature. Our techniques are based on a recent characterization of SPEs in prefix-independent games that is grounded on the notions of requirements and negotiation, and according to which the plays supported by SPEs are exactly the plays consistent with the requirement that is the least fixed point of the negotiation function. The new results are as follows. First, checking that a given requirement is a fixed point of the negotiation function is an NP-complete problem. Second, we show that the SPE constrained existence problem is NP-complete, this problem was previously known to be ExpTime-easy and NP-hard. Third, the SPE constrained existence problem is fixed-parameter tractable when the number of players and of colors are parameters. Fourth, deciding whether some requirement is the least fixed point of the negotiation function is complete for the second level of the Boolean hierarchy. Finally, the SPE-verification problem - that is, the problem of deciding whether there exists a play supported by a SPE that satisfies some LTL formula - is PSpace-complete, this problem was known to be ExpTime-easy and PSpace-hard.

Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games. In 30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 216, pp. 10:1-10:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2022)


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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{On the Complexity of SPEs in Parity Games}},
  booktitle =	{30th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2022)},
  pages =	{10:1--10:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-218-1},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2022},
  volume =	{216},
  editor =	{Manea, Florin and Simpson, Alex},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-157306},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2022.10},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, subgame-perfect equilibria, parity objectives}
}
Document
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games

Authors: Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard

Published in: LIPIcs, Volume 203, 32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021)


Abstract
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with the least fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we show that the negotiation function is piecewise linear, and can be analyzed using the linear algebraic tool box. As a corollary, we prove the decidability of the SPE constrained existence problem, whose status was left open in the literature.

Cite as

Léonard Brice, Jean-François Raskin, and Marie van den Bogaard. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games. In 32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 203, pp. 8:1-8:17, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2021)


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@InProceedings{brice_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8,
  author =	{Brice, L\'{e}onard and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois and van den Bogaard, Marie},
  title =	{{Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Mean-Payoff Games}},
  booktitle =	{32nd International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2021)},
  pages =	{8:1--8:17},
  series =	{Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
  ISBN =	{978-3-95977-203-7},
  ISSN =	{1868-8969},
  year =	{2021},
  volume =	{203},
  editor =	{Haddad, Serge and Varacca, Daniele},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8},
  URN =		{urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-143854},
  doi =		{10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2021.8},
  annote =	{Keywords: Games on graphs, subgame-perfect equilibria, mean-payoff objectives.}
}
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