This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In these games, one player, referred to as the system, declares his strategy upfront. The other players, composing the environment, then rationally make their moves according to their objectives. The rational behavior of these responding players is captured through two models: they opt for strategies that either represent a Nash equilibrium or lead to a play with a Pareto-optimal cost tuple.
@InProceedings{bruyere_et_al:LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14, author = {Bruy\`{e}re, V\'{e}ronique and Grandmont, Christophe and Raskin, Jean-Fran\c{c}ois}, title = {{As Soon as Possible but Rationally}}, booktitle = {35th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2024)}, pages = {14:1--14:20}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-339-3}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2024}, volume = {311}, editor = {Majumdar, Rupak and Silva, Alexandra}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-207869}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.CONCUR.2024.14}, annote = {Keywords: Games played on graphs, rational verification, rational synthesis, Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimality, quantitative reachability objectives} }
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