License
When quoting this document, please refer to the following
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-18908
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1890/
Go to the corresponding Portal

Canetti, Ran ; Cheung, Ling ; Kaynar, Dilsun ; Lynch, Nancy ; Pereira, Olivier

Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems

pdf-format:
Document 1.pdf (357 KB)

Abstract

For many cryptographic protocols, security relies on the assumption that adversarial entities have limited computational power. This type of security degrades progressively over the lifetime of a protocol. However, some cryptographic services, such as timestamping services or digital archives, are emph{long-lived} in nature; they are expected to be secure and operational for a very long time (ie super-polynomial). In such cases, security cannot be guaranteed in the traditional sense: a computationally secure protocol may become insecure if the attacker has a super-polynomial number of interactions with the protocol. This paper proposes a new paradigm for the analysis of long-lived security protocols. We allow entities to be active for a potentially unbounded amount of real time, provided they perform only a polynomial amount of work emph{per unit of real time}. Moreover, the space used by these entities is allocated dynamically and must be polynomially bounded. We propose a new notion of emph{long-term implementation}, which is an adaptation of computational indistinguishability to the long-lived setting. We show that long-term implementation is preserved under polynomial parallel composition and exponential sequential composition. We illustrate the use of this new paradigm by analyzing some security properties of the long-lived timestamping protocol of Haber and Kamat.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{canetti_et_al:DSP:2009:1890,
  author =	{Ran Canetti and Ling Cheung and Dilsun Kaynar and Nancy Lynch and Olivier Pereira},
  title =	{Modeling Computational Security in Long-Lived Systems},
  booktitle =	{Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security},
  year =	{2009},
  editor =	{Ran Canetti and Shafi Goldwasser and G{\"u}nter M{\"u}ller and Rainer Steinwandt},
  number =	{08491},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1890},
  annote =	{Keywords: Long lived security; universally composable security;}
}

Keywords: Long lived security; universally composable security;
Seminar: 08491 - Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security
Issue Date: 2009
Date of publication: 27.02.2009

DROPS-Home | Fulltext Search | Imprint Published by LZI