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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19576
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1957/
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Krause, Matthias ;
Stegemann, Dirk
Algebraic Attacks against Linear RFID Authentication Protocols
Abstract
The limited computational resources available on RFID tags imply a
need for specially designed authentication protocols. The light weight
authentication protocol $extsf{HB}^+$ proposed by Juels and Weis seems currently
secure for several RFID applications, but is too slow for many practical
settings.
As a possible alternative, authentication protocols based on choosing
random elements from $L$ secret linear $n$-dimensional subspaces of
$GF(2)^{n+k}$ (so called linear $(n,k,L)$-protocols), have been considered. We show that to a certain extent, these protocols are vulnerable to algebraic
attacks. Particularly, our approach allows to break Cicho'{n}, Klonowski and Kutyl owski's $ extsf{CKK}^2$-protocol, a special linear
$(n,k,2)$-protocol, for practically recommended parameters in less
than a second on a standard PC. Moreover, we show that
even unrestricted $(n,k,L)$-protocols can be efficiently broken if $L$ is too small.
BibTeX - Entry
@InProceedings{krause_et_al:DSP:2009:1957,
author = {Matthias Krause and Dirk Stegemann},
title = {Algebraic Attacks against Linear RFID Authentication Protocols},
booktitle = {Symmetric Cryptography },
year = {2009},
editor = {Helena Handschuh and Stefan Lucks and Bart Preneel and Phillip Rogaway},
number = {09031},
series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
ISSN = {1862-4405},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, Germany},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1957},
annote = {Keywords: RFID Authentication, HB+, CKK, CKK2}
}
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Keywords: |
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RFID Authentication, HB+, CKK, CKK2 |
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Seminar: |
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09031 - Symmetric Cryptography |
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Issue Date: |
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2009 |
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Date of publication: |
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30.03.2009 |