Revealed preference, iterated belief revision and dynamic games

Abstract

In previous work (G. Bonanno, Rational choice and AGM belief revision, 
Artificial Intelligence, 2009) a semantics for AGM belief revision 
was proposed based on choice frames, borrowed from the rational 
choice literature. In this paper we discuss how to use choice frames 
to analyze extensive-form games. Given an extensive form with perfect 
recall, a choice frame can be used to represent a player's initial 
beliefs and her disposition to change those beliefs when she is 
informed that it is her turn to move. When some players move more 
than once along some play of the game, the issue of iterated belief 
revision arises. We provide a semantics for iterated belief revision 
in terms of choice frames and provide an outline of how to use choice 
frames to analyze solution concepts for extensive-form games.