The high amount of trust put into today's software systems calls for a rigorous analysis of their security. Unfortunately, security is often in conflict with requirements on the functionality or the performance of a system, making perfect security an impossible or overly expensive goal. Under such constraints, the relevant question is not whether a system is secure, but rather how much security it provides. Quantitative notions of security can express degrees of protection and thus enable reasoning about the trade-off between security and conflicting requirements. Corresponding quantitative security analyses bear the potential of becoming an important tool for the rigorous development of practical systems, and a formal foundation for the management of security risks.
@Article{kopf_et_al:DagRep.2.11.135, author = {K\"{o}pf, Boris and Malacaria, Paquale and Palamidessi, Catuscia}, title = {{Quantitative Security Analysis (Dagstuhl Seminar 12481)}}, pages = {135--154}, journal = {Dagstuhl Reports}, ISSN = {2192-5283}, year = {2013}, volume = {2}, number = {11}, editor = {K\"{o}pf, Boris and Malacaria, Paquale and Palamidessi, Catuscia}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagRep.2.11.135}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-39824}, doi = {10.4230/DagRep.2.11.135}, annote = {Keywords: Security, Privacy,Information theory, Programming languages, Formal methods} }
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