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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-2038
URL: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/203/
Gimpel, Henner

Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining

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Abstract

Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.

BibTeX - Entry

@InProceedings{gimpel:DSP:2005:203,
  author =	{Henner Gimpel},
  title =	{Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining},
  booktitle =	{Computing and Markets},
  year =	{2005},
  editor =	{Daniel Lehmann and Rudolf M{\"u}ller and Tuomas Sandholm},
  number =	{05011},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/203},
  annote =	{Keywords: compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio}
}

Keywords: compact representation of games, congestion games, local-effect games, action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio
Seminar: 05011 - Computing and Markets
Issue date: 2005
Date of publication: 19.07.2005

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