DagSemProc.07261.6.pdf
- Filesize: 247 kB
- 31 pages
Document
Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure
Authors
-
Part of:
Volume:
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2007-11-26
Cite AsGet BibTex
Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, and Christian Klamler. Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-31, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.6
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.6
Abstract
Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts (n-1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or efficient, but divide-and-conquer (D&C) minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player may envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively to place marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, then halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C (i) ensures players of more than 1/n shares if their marks are different and (ii) is strategyproof for risk-averse players. However, D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are briefly discussed.
Keywords
- Cake-cutting
- proportionality
- envy-freeness
- efficiency
- strategy-proofness
Metrics
- Access Statistics
-
Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
0PDF Downloads