Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik GmbH scholarly article en Brams, Steven J.; Jones, Michael A.; Klamler, Christian License
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URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12211

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Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure



Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts (n – 1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or efficient, but divide-and-conquer (D&C) minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player may envy. It works by asking n ? 2 players successively to place marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, then halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C (i) ensures players of more than 1/n shares if their marks are different and (ii) is strategyproof for risk-averse players. However, D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are briefly discussed.

BibTeX - Entry

  author =	{Steven J. Brams and Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler},
  title =	{Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure},
  booktitle =	{Fair Division},
  year =	{2007},
  editor =	{Steven Brams and Kirk Pruhs and Gerhard Woeginger},
  number =	{07261},
  series =	{Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings},
  ISSN =	{1862-4405},
  publisher =	{Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum f{\"u}r Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany},
  address =	{Dagstuhl, Germany},
  URL =		{},
  annote =	{Keywords: Cake-cutting, proportionality, envy-freeness, efficiency, strategy-proofness}

Keywords: Cake-cutting, proportionality, envy-freeness, efficiency, strategy-proofness
Seminar: 07261 - Fair Division
Related Scholarly Article:
Issue date: 2007
Date of publication: 2007

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