DagSemProc.07261.12.pdf
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Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2007-11-26
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Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12
Abstract
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give
tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on
related machines. We also give tight bounds for $k$-strong
equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most
$k$, for unrelated machines.
Keywords
- Game theory
- Strong Nash equilibria
- Load balancing
- Price of Anarchy
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