DagSemProc.09351.4.pdf
- Filesize: 264 kB
- 22 pages
Document
Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'
Author
-
Part of:
Volume:
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9351
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2009-11-04
Cite AsGet BibTex
Jan M. Broersen. Deontic Epistemic stit Logic Distinguishing Modes of `Mens Rea'. In Information processing, rational belief change and social interaction. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 9351, pp. 1-22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.09351.4
Abstract
Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw-
ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Dif-
ferent law systems distinguish different modes of mens rea. For instance,
American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal
act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several
of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring
operators for stit-actions taking effect in `next' states, S5-knowledge op-
erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The different modes of `mens
rea' correspond to the violation conditions of different types of obligation
definable in the logic.
Keywords
- Product update
- agency
- stit theory
- knowingly doing
Metrics
- Access Statistics
-
Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
0PDF Downloads