DagSemProc.10101.3.pdf
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False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2010-05-20
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Makoto Yokoo. False-name-Proof Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms. In Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 10101, pp. 1-4, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.10101.3
Abstract
In Internet auctions, it is easy for a bidder to submit multiple bids
under multiple identifiers (e.g., multiple e-mail addresses).
If only one good is sold, a bidder cannot make any additional profit by using multiple bids. However, in combinatorial auctions, where multiple
goods are sold simultaneously, submitting multiple bids under fictitious names can be profitable. A bid made under a fictitious name is called a {em false-name bid}. In this talk, I describe the summary of existing works and open problems
on false-name bids.
Keywords
- Combinatorial auctions
- mechanism design
- false-name bids
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