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Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining

Author Henner Gimpel

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Henner Gimpel

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Henner Gimpel. Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)


Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.
  • compact representation of games
  • congestion games
  • local-effect games
  • action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio


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