DagSemProc.05011.13.pdf
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Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2005-07-19
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Henner Gimpel. Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue Bargaining. In Computing and Markets. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 5011, pp. 1-5, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2005)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.05011.13
Abstract
Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterpartys offers.
Subject Classification
Keywords
- compact representation of games
- congestion games
- local-effect games
- action-graph gamescomputational markets; auctions; bidding strategiesNegotiatio
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