Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Authors Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky

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Amos Fiat
Meital Levy
Haim Kaplan
Svetlana Olonetsky

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Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007)


As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for $k$-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most $k$, for unrelated machines.
  • Game theory
  • Strong Nash equilibria
  • Load balancing
  • Price of Anarchy


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