Strong Price of Anarchy  for  Machine Load Balancing

Fiat, Amos; Levy, Meital; Kaplan, Haim; Olonetsky, Svetlana

doi:10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12

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Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing

Authors Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky

Part of: Volume: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261
Part of: Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)
License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Publication Date: 2007-11-26

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Document Identifiers

DOI: 10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12
URN: urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-12256

Subject Classification

Keywords

Game theory
Strong Nash equilibria
Load balancing
Price of Anarchy

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Abstract

As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give
tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on
related machines. We also give tight bounds for $k$-strong
equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most
$k$, for unrelated machines.

Cite As Get BibTex

Amos Fiat, Meital Levy, Haim Kaplan, and Svetlana Olonetsky. Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing. In Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 7261, pp. 1-19, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2007) https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.12

Author Details

Amos Fiat

Meital Levy

Haim Kaplan

Svetlana Olonetsky

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