Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions

Authors Lonneke Mous, Valentin Robu, Han La Poutre

Thumbnail PDF


  • Filesize: 308 kB
  • 35 pages

Document Identifiers

Author Details

Lonneke Mous
Valentin Robu
Han La Poutre

Cite AsGet BibTex

Lonneke Mous, Valentin Robu, and Han La Poutre. Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions. In Planning in Multiagent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461, pp. 1-35, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)


The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in separate auctions. In this talk, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the items themselves. We provide a brief overview of the state of the art in this field and discuss, based on our recent results, under which conditions using option mechanisms would be desirable for both buyers and sellers, by comparison to direct auctioning of items. We conclude with a brief discussion of further research directions in this field, as well as the relation to other techniques proposed to address the problem, such as leveled commitment mechanisms.
  • Options
  • sequential auctions
  • multi-agent systems
  • exposure problem
  • bidding strategies
  • mechanism design
  • leveled commitment


  • Access Statistics
  • Total Accesses (updated on a weekly basis)
    PDF Downloads
Questions / Remarks / Feedback

Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing

Thanks for your feedback!

Feedback submitted

Could not send message

Please try again later or send an E-mail