DagSemProc.08461.5.pdf
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Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions
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Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461
Series: Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
- Publication Date: 2009-02-05
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Lonneke Mous, Valentin Robu, and Han La Poutre. Using Options with Set Exercise Prices to Reduce Bidder Exposure in Sequential Auctions. In Planning in Multiagent Systems. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, Volume 8461, pp. 1-35, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2009)
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5
https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.08461.5
Abstract
The exposure problem appears whenever an agent with complementary valuations bids to acquire a bundle of items sold sequentially, in separate auctions. In this talk, we review a possible solution that can help solve this problem, which involves selling options for the items, instead of the items themselves. We provide a brief overview of the state of the art in this field and discuss, based on our recent results, under which conditions using option mechanisms would be desirable for both buyers and sellers, by comparison to direct auctioning of items. We conclude with a brief discussion of further research directions in this field, as well as the relation to other techniques proposed to address the problem, such as leveled commitment mechanisms.
Keywords
- Options
- sequential auctions
- multi-agent systems
- exposure problem
- bidding strategies
- mechanism design
- leveled commitment
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