The EnRUPT hash functions were proposed by O'Neil, Nohl and Henzen as candidates for the SHA-3 competition, organised by NIST. The proposal contains seven hash functions, each having a different digest length. We present a practical collision attack on all of these seven EnRUPT variants. The time complexity of our attack varies from $2^{36}$ to $2^{40}$ round computations, depending on the EnRUPT variant, and the memory requirements are negligible. We demonstrate that our attack is practical by giving an actual collision example for EnRUPT-256.
@InProceedings{indesteege_et_al:DagSemProc.09031.12, author = {Indesteege, Sebastiaan and Preneel, Bart}, title = {{Practical Collisions for EnRUPT}}, booktitle = {Symmetric Cryptography}, pages = {1--15}, series = {Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings (DagSemProc)}, ISSN = {1862-4405}, year = {2009}, volume = {9031}, editor = {Helena Handschuh and Stefan Lucks and Bart Preneel and Phillip Rogaway}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.12}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-19509}, doi = {10.4230/DagSemProc.09031.12}, annote = {Keywords: EnRUPT, SHA-3 candidate, hash function, collision attack} }
Feedback for Dagstuhl Publishing