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Practical Large-Scale Proof-Of-Stake Asynchronous Total-Order Broadcast

Authors Orestis Alpos, Christian Cachin, Simon Holmgaard Kamp, Jesper Buus Nielsen

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Author Details

Orestis Alpos
  • University of Bern, Switzerland
Christian Cachin
  • University of Bern, Switzerland
Simon Holmgaard Kamp
  • Aarhus University, Denmark
Jesper Buus Nielsen
  • Aarhus University, Denmark

Funding

This work has received funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) under grant agreement Nr . 200021_188443 (Advanced Consensus Protocols). Simon Holmgaard Kamp and Jesper Buus Nielsen are partially funded by The Concordium Foundation.

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Orestis Alpos, Christian Cachin, Simon Holmgaard Kamp, and Jesper Buus Nielsen. Practical Large-Scale Proof-Of-Stake Asynchronous Total-Order Broadcast. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 31:1-31:22, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.31

Abstract

We present simple and practical protocols for generating randomness as used by asynchronous total-order broadcast. The protocols are secure in a proof-of-stake setting with dynamically changing stake. They can be plugged into existing protocols for asynchronous total-order broadcast and will turn these into asynchronous total-order broadcast with dynamic stake. Our contribution relies on two important techniques. The paper "Random Oracles in Constantinople: Practical Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement using Cryptography" [Cachin, Kursawe, and Shoup, PODC 2000] has influenced the design of practical total-order broadcast through its use of threshold cryptography. However, it needs a setup protocol to be efficient. In a proof-of-stake setting with dynamic stake this setup would have to be continually recomputed, making the protocol impractical. The work "Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement with Subquadratic Communication" [Blum, Katz, Liu-Zhang, and Loss, TCC 2020] showed how to use an initial setup for broadcast to asymptotically efficiently generate sub-sequent setups. The protocol, however, resorted to fully homomorphic encryption and was therefore not practically efficient. We adopt their approach to the proof-of-stake setting with dynamic stake, apply it to the Constantinople paper, and remove the need for fully homomorphic encryption. This results in simple and practical proof-of-stake protocols.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Distributed algorithms
Keywords
  • Total-Order Broadcast
  • Atomic Broadcast
  • Proof of Stake
  • Random Beacon

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