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STROBE: Streaming Threshold Random Beacons

Authors Donald Beaver, Konstantinos Chalkias, Mahimna Kelkar, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias, Kevin Lewi, Ladi de Naurois, Valeria Nikolaenko, Arnab Roy, Alberto Sonnino

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Author Details

Donald Beaver
  • Independent Scholar, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Konstantinos Chalkias
  • Mysten Labs, Palo Alto, CA, USA
Mahimna Kelkar
  • Cornell University, New York City, NY, USA
Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias
  • Mysten Labs, London, UK
  • IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria
Kevin Lewi
  • Meta Platforms, Inc., Menlo Park, CA, USA
Ladi de Naurois
  • Washington DC, USA
Valeria Nikolaenko
  • a16z crypto, Palo Alto, CA, USA
Arnab Roy
  • Mysten Labs, Palo Alto, CA, USA
Alberto Sonnino
  • Mysten Labs, London, UK
  • University College London, UK

Acknowledgements

Work done when all the authors were at Novi Research, Meta.

Cite AsGet BibTex

Donald Beaver, Konstantinos Chalkias, Mahimna Kelkar, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias, Kevin Lewi, Ladi de Naurois, Valeria Nikolaenko, Arnab Roy, and Alberto Sonnino. STROBE: Streaming Threshold Random Beacons. In 5th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2023). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 282, pp. 7:1-7:16, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2023)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2023.7

Abstract

We revisit decentralized random beacons with a focus on practical distributed applications. Decentralized random beacons (Beaver and So, Eurocrypt'93) provide the functionality for n parties to generate an unpredictable sequence of bits in a way that cannot be biased, which is useful for any decentralized protocol requiring trusted randomness. Existing beacon constructions are highly inefficient in practical settings where protocol parties need to rejoin after crashes or disconnections, and more significantly where smart contracts may rely on arbitrary index points in high-volume streams. For this, we introduce a new notion of history-generating decentralized random beacons (HGDRBs). Roughly, the history-generation property of HGDRBs allows for previous beacon outputs to be efficiently generated knowing only the current value and the public key. At application layers, history-generation supports registering a sparser set of on-chain values if desired, so that apps like lotteries can utilize on-chain values without incurring high-frequency costs, enjoying all the benefits of DRBs implemented off-chain or with decoupled, special-purpose chains. Unlike rollups, HG is tailored specifically to recovering and verifying pseudorandom bit sequences and thus enjoys unique optimizations investigated in this work. We introduce STROBE: an efficient HGDRB construction which generalizes the original squaring-based RSA approach of Beaver and So. STROBE enjoys several useful properties that make it suited for practical applications that use beacons: 1) history-generating: it can regenerate and verify high-throughput beacon streams, supporting sparse (thus cost-effective) ledger entries; 2) concisely self-verifying: NIZK-free, with state and validation employing a single ring element; 3) eco-friendly: stake-based rather than work based; 4) unbounded: refresh-free, addressing limitations of Beaver and So; 5) delay-free: results are immediately available. 6) storage-efficient: the last beacon suffices to derive all past outputs, thus O(1) storage requirements for nodes serving the whole history.

Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Security and privacy → Public key encryption
Keywords
  • decentralized randomness
  • beacons
  • consensus
  • blockchain
  • lottery

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