,
Connor Shaw
,
Ghada Almashaqbeh
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Selfish mining undermines incentive compatibility of proof-of-work blockchains, letting a miner earn disproportionate rewards at a hashrate lower than the majority threshold. A decade of research has investigated whether a strategy is profitable, however, far less is understood about when it becomes profitable. Timing is critical since selfish mining operates at a loss before it turns a profit, typically requiring tens of weeks to break even in the classic case. In this paper, we present a holistic study of the time-to-profitability (TTP) of existing selfish mining strategies structured around four contributions. First, in the single-attacker setting, we characterize TTP across the full strategy space and find that TTP-minimizing and profit-maximizing strategies frequently diverge, making attack horizon a critical metric. In particular, under realistic fee dynamics, the use of incentive transactions to recruit honest-but-rational miners enables reaching profitability up to 15× faster than classic selfish mining at the same hash rate. Second, we study TTP for the first time in the multi-attacker setting, showing that the difference in strategies between opposing attackers has a dramatic impact on join profitability. Third, we generalize intermittent selfish mining by examining temporal composition over the full strategy space and showing that its purported benefits are largely overstated; alternating strategies rarely outperforms the best static strategy in terms of TTP and long-term profits. Finally, and building on these findings, we investigate adaptive, state-conditioned strategy selection at the difficulty adjustment period (DAP) level. We compare a general-purpose LLM agent against a fixed decision-tree selector. We find that both selectors reliably identify profit-maximizing strategies from observed network conditions, at a low operational cost, thus lowering the expertise barrier to exploiting adaptive selfish mining.
@InProceedings{finkbeiner_et_al:LIPIcs.AFT.2026.29,
author = {Finkbeiner, Colin and Shaw, Connor and Almashaqbeh, Ghada},
title = {{When Does Being Selfish Pay Off? Temporal Composability and Profitability in Selfish Mining}},
booktitle = {8th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2026)},
pages = {29:1--29:23},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-451-2},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2026},
volume = {395},
editor = {Kiayias, Aggelos and Kyropoulou, Maria},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.29},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-278839},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2026.29},
annote = {Keywords: Bitcoin, Proof of work, Selfish mining, Temporal mining strategies}
}
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