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Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner

Author Reyna Hulett

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Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Solution concepts in game theory
  • Mathematics of computing → Approximation algorithms
Keywords
  • Voting theory
  • mechanism design
  • query complexity
  • approximation

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Abstract

Single-elimination (SE) brackets appear commonly in both sports tournaments and the voting theory literature. In certain tournament models, they have been shown to select the unambiguously-strongest competitor with optimum probability. By contrast, we reevaluate SE brackets through the lens of approximation, where the goal is to select a winner who would beat the most other competitors in a round robin (i.e., maximize the Copeland score), and find them lacking. Our primary result establishes the approximation ratio of a randomly-seeded SE bracket is 2^{- Theta(sqrt{log n})}; this is underwhelming considering a 1/2 ratio is achieved by choosing a winner uniformly at random. We also establish that a generalized version of the SE bracket performs nearly as poorly, with an approximation ratio of 2^{- Omega(sqrt[4]{log n})}, addressing a decade-old open question in the voting tree literature.

Cite As Get BibTex

Reyna Hulett. Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques (APPROX/RANDOM 2019). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 145, pp. 13:1-13:20, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2019) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2019.13

Author Details

Reyna Hulett
  • Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, CA, USA

Funding

Supported in part by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship under grant DGE-1656518.

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Benjamin Plaut and Mary Wootters for many helpful discussions.

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