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Verification of Security Protocols (Invited Talk)

Author Véronique Cortier

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Subject Classification

ACM Subject Classification
  • Security and privacy → Formal security models
Keywords
  • Security protocols
  • automated deduction
  • security

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Abstract

Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks like the Internet. Over the past decades, numerous decision procedures and tools have been developed to automatically analyse the security of protocols. The field has now reached a good level of maturity with efficient techniques for the automatic security analysis of protocols
After an overview of some famous protocols and flaws, we will describe the current techniques for security protocols analysis, often based on logic, and review the key challenges towards a fully automated verification.

Cite As Get BibTex

Véronique Cortier. Verification of Security Protocols (Invited Talk). In 28th EACSL Annual Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL 2020). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 152, pp. 1:1-1:2, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2020) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.CSL.2020.1

Author Details

Véronique Cortier
  • LORIA - CNRS, INRIA, Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France

Funding

This work has been partially supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research (grant agreement No 645865-SPOOC).

References

  1. Bruno Blanchet. An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules. In 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW-14), pages 82-96. IEEE Computer Society, June 2001. Google Scholar
  2. Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, and Mathieu Turuani. A little more conversation, a little less action, a lot more satisfaction: Global states in ProVerif. In Proceedings of the 31st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'18), pages 344-358, 2018. Google Scholar
  3. Vincent Cheval, Steve Kremer, and Itsaka Rakotonirina. The DEEPSEC prover. In Proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV'18). Springer, July 2018. Google Scholar
  4. Véronique Cortier, Stéphanie Delaune, and Antoine Dallon. SAT-Equiv: an efficient tool for equivalence properties. In Proceedings of the 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'17). IEEE Computer Society Press, August 2017. Google Scholar
  5. Jeremy Dawson and Alwen Tiu. Automating open bisimulation checking for the spi-calculus. In IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF 2010), 2010. Google Scholar
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