,
Santiago Schnell,
Jakub Svoboda
,
Michelle X. Yeo
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
Liquid democracy permits voters either to vote directly or to delegate their votes to others. Existing algorithmic analyses usually assign each voter a single scalar competence parameter, representing an independent probability of voting for the ground truth. This representation is inadequate when delegation is fixed before later public information changes different voters' reliability in different ways. In this work, we study a minimal common-signal model of this realistic phenomenon. Delegation occurs before a public binary signal is realised, while voting occurs afterwards. Conditional on the signal, sink votes are independent and each voter has a signal-specific competence; marginally, correctness events are correlated through the common signal. We show that delegation based on average competence is not a safe scalarisation. We then present three novel delegation mechanisms for this setting. We analyse and show the precise conditions under which our mechanisms inherit delegation desiderata, as well as outline the tradeoffs between these mechanisms.
@InProceedings{gilbert_et_al:LIPIcs.DISC.2026.64,
author = {Gilbert, Seth and Schmid, Stefan and Schnell, Santiago and Svoboda, Jakub and Yeo, Michelle X.},
title = {{Brief Announcement: Liquid Democracy Under Vote Correlation: On the Fallacies of Averaging and the Excluded Middle}},
booktitle = {40th International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2026)},
pages = {64:1--64:6},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-454-3},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2026},
volume = {397},
editor = {Moses Jr., William K. and Censor-Hillel, Keren},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2026.64},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-281701},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.DISC.2026.64},
annote = {Keywords: Liquid democracy, Voting, Delegation, Mechanism design, Distributed algorithms}
}