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Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times

Authors Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub

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ACM Subject Classification
  • Theory of computation → Scheduling algorithms
  • Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design
Keywords
  • Scheduling
  • Mechanism design
  • Online algorithms

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Abstract

We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic agents, delaying scheduling decisions makes little sense. Moreover, the mechanism has a particularly simple form of an anonymous menu of options.

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Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, and Tzahi Taub. Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. In 26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2018). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 112, pp. 27:1-27:14, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2018) https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2018.27

Author Details

Alon Eden
  • Tel Aviv University, Israel
Michal Feldman
  • Tel Aviv University and Microsoft Research, Israel
Amos Fiat
  • Tel Aviv University, Israel
Tzahi Taub
  • Tel Aviv University, Israel

Funding

This work was partially supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement number 337122, by the ISF (grant number 317/17), and by the ISF (grant number 1841/14).

References

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