Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing. Existing interactive-proof games largely fall into two categories: either as games of cooperation such as multi-prover interactive proofs and cooperative rational proofs, where the provers work together as a team; or as games of conflict such as refereed games, where the provers directly compete with each other in a zero-sum game. Neither of these extremes truly capture the strategic nature of service providers in outsourcing applications. How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem. In this paper, we introduce a mechanism-design approach to define a multi-prover interactive-proof model in which the provers are rational and non-cooperative - they act to maximize their expected utility given others' strategies. We define a strong notion of backwards induction as our solution concept to analyze the resulting extensive-form game with imperfect information. We fully characterize the complexity of our proof system under different utility gap guarantees. (At a high level, a utility gap of u means that the protocol is robust against provers that may not care about a utility loss of 1/u.) We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P^{NEXP}.
@InProceedings{chen_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2019.29, author = {Chen, Jing and McCauley, Samuel and Singh, Shikha}, title = {{Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs}}, booktitle = {27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2019)}, pages = {29:1--29:16}, series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)}, ISBN = {978-3-95977-124-5}, ISSN = {1868-8969}, year = {2019}, volume = {144}, editor = {Bender, Michael A. and Svensson, Ola and Herman, Grzegorz}, publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik}, address = {Dagstuhl, Germany}, URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.29}, URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-111508}, doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2019.29}, annote = {Keywords: non-cooperative game theory, extensive-form games with imperfect information, refined sequential equilibrium, rational proofs, interactive proofs} }
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