,
Omri Weinstein
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license
We revisit the longstanding open problem of implementing Nakamoto’s proof-of-work (PoW) consensus based on a real-world computational task T(x) (as opposed to artificial random hashing), in a truly permissionless setting where the miner itself chooses the input x. The challenge in designing such a Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) protocol is to use the native computation of T(x) to produce a PoW certificate with prescribed hardness and with negligible computational overhead over the worst-case complexity of T(⋅). This ensures malicious miners cannot "game the system" by fooling the verifier to accept with higher probability than honest miners while using similar resources. Indeed, obtaining a PoUW with O(1)-factor overhead is trivial for any task T, but also useless. Our main result is a PoUW for the task of matrix multiplication MatMul(A,B) of arbitrary matrices, with 1+o(1) multiplicative overhead compared to naïve MatMul. We conjecture that our protocol has optimal security, in the sense that a malicious prover cannot obtain any significant advantage over an honest prover. This conjecture reduces the hardness of our protocol to the task of solving a batch of correlated low-rank random linear systems, which is of independent interest. Since matrix multiplications are the bottleneck of AI compute as well as countless industry-scale applications, this primitive suggests a concrete design of a new L1 base-layer protocol which nearly eliminates the energy waste of Bitcoin mining, allowing GPU consumers to reduce their AI training and inference costs by "re-using" them for blockchain consensus, in exchange for block rewards (2-for-1).
@InProceedings{komargodski_et_al:LIPIcs.ESA.2026.2,
author = {Komargodski, Ilan and Weinstein, Omri},
title = {{Proofs of Useful Work from Arbitrary Matrix Multiplication}},
booktitle = {34th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA 2026)},
pages = {2:1--2:17},
series = {Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)},
ISBN = {978-3-95977-445-1},
ISSN = {1868-8969},
year = {2026},
volume = {388},
editor = {Bille, Philip and Pettie, Seth and Storandt, Sabine},
publisher = {Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Informatik},
address = {Dagstuhl, Germany},
URL = {https://drops.dagstuhl.de/entities/document/10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2026.2},
URN = {urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-271385},
doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.ESA.2026.2},
annote = {Keywords: Proof of work, blockchain, matrix multiplication, fine-grained complexity, random self-reducibility}
}