Computationally Sound Abstraction and Verification of Secure Multi-Party Computations

Authors Michael Backes, Matteo Maffei, Esfandiar Mohammadi

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Michael Backes
Matteo Maffei
Esfandiar Mohammadi

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Michael Backes, Matteo Maffei, and Esfandiar Mohammadi. Computationally Sound Abstraction and Verification of Secure Multi-Party Computations. In IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2010). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 8, pp. 352-363, Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2010)


We devise an abstraction of secure multi-party computations in the applied $\pi$-calculus. Based on this abstraction, we propose a methodology to mechanically analyze the security of cryptographic protocols employing secure multi-party computations. We exemplify the applicability of our framework by analyzing the SIMAP sugar-beet double auction protocol. We finally study the computational soundness of our abstraction, proving that the analysis of protocols expressed in the applied $\pi$-calculus and based on our abstraction provides computational security guarantees.
  • Computational soundness
  • Secure multi-party computation
  • Process calculi
  • Protocol verification


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