LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.575.pdf
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Secure Refinements of Communication Channels
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35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015)
Series: Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
Conference: IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS) - License:
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license
- Publication date: 2015-12-14
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Vincent Cheval, Véronique Cortier, and Eric le Morvan. Secure Refinements of Communication Channels. In 35th IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS 2015). Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), Volume 45, pp. 575-589, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik (2015)
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.575
https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2015.575
Abstract
It is a common practice to design a protocol (say Q) assuming some secure channels. Then the secure channels are implemented using any standard protocol, e.g. TLS. In this paper, we study when such a practice is indeed secure.
We provide a characterization of both confidential and authenticated channels. As an application, we study several protocols of the literature including TLS and BAC protocols. Thanks to our result, we can consider a larger number of sessions when analyzing complex protocols resulting from explicit implementation of the secure channels of some more abstract protocol Q.
Keywords
- Protocol
- Composition
- Formal methods
- Channels
- Implementation
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